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ABSTRACT
My project is an examination of the concept of authenticity, as it is problematized in the works of 
Philip K. Dick; specifically, in his Hugo Award-winning The Man in the High Castle (1962) and in his 
best-selling novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968).  Dick believes that authenticity is 
essential for human existence, but finds the concept problematized by technologies which make 
possible increasingly perfect reproductions and replications, as well as by the effect these technologies 
have on the human subject.  Furthermore, these technologies are linked to the economic mode of 
advanced consumerism.  
Taking my lead from Fredric Jameson and the contributors to the journal Science-Fiction 
Studies, I view Dick's work as a form of cultural criticism, and an engagement with postmodernism.  In 
this light, the problem of authenticity in Dick's work is revealed as symptomatic of his criticism of 
mass, consumer culture.  My thesis therefore becomes an examination of Dick's relationship to 
postmodernism, with a special focus on how that relationship affects his dealings with the idea of 
authenticity.
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Introduction
DEFINING TERMS/THE STUDY OF  …  :
1. Science Fiction
For various reasons, the definition of "science fiction" has long been the subject of 
discussion, argument, and criticism.  Much of this stems from the existence of sf's sister-
genre, "fantasy," and a need to differentiate between the two.  Often this discussion is also 
the result of a certain form of elitism, wherein sf needs to be properly defined and 
categorized, so that it can be segregated away from the rest of literature and, presumably, 
left to die.  Whatever the reason, the act of refining the definition of "science fiction" has 
been a cornerstone of the study of science fiction, ever since that study began.
One of the first critical reviews of science fiction literature is Kingsley Amis' New 
Maps of Hell: A Survey of Science Fiction (1960).  In this early work, Amis identifies a 
characteristic of science fiction, a characteristic which will be developed by later critics, 
one that is important to the study of sf:  "Its most important use, I submit, is as a means of 
dramatizing social inquiry, or providing a fictional mode in which cultural tendencies can 
be isolated and judged" (63).  Here, Amis clearly connects science fiction with social and 
cultural inquiry.  The idea that sf functions best as a critical mode will be taken up by 
other theorists in the future; in particular, it shows up in the works of Darko Suvin, whose 
Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre 
(1979) is often treated as a canonical text in the study of sf.  Damien Broderick comments 
that "Suvin's contribution has been absorbed so generally that it can seem transparently 
given" (Reading by Starlight 32).
Suvin, editor of the journal Science-Fiction Studies from 1973-1980, distinguishes 
some of the crucial elements of science fiction.  In particular, he identifies the role of the 
novum in sf, and puts forward the concept of "SF as the literature of cognitive 
estrangement" (4).    
The novum is "a strange newness" (4), a novelty or innovation "validated by 
cognitive logic" (63).  Suvin explains: 
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The aliens--utopians, monsters, or simply different strangers--are a mirror 
to man just as the differing country is a mirror for his world.  But the 
mirror is not only a reflecting one, it is also a transforming one, virgin 
womb and alchemical dynamo: the mirror is a crucible … this genre has 
always been wedded to a hope of finding in the unknown the ideal 
environment, tribe, state, intelligence, or other aspect of the Supreme 
Good (or to a fear of and revulsion from its contrary).  At all events, the 
possibility of other strange, co-variant coordinate systems and semantic 
fields is assumed. (5)
In other words, the novum is whatever makes the world of the story into a science-
fictional world, be it faster-than-light travel, intelligent alien life forms, human-like 
androids, etc.  
His second contribution, the concept of "cognitive estrangement," he explains this 
way: "confronting a set normative system … with a point of view or look implying a new 
set of norms … in SF the attitude of estrangement … has grown into the formal 
framework of the genre" (6-7).  Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. explains, 
Sf text presents aspects of a reader's empirical reality 'made strange' 
through a new perspective 'implying a new set of norms.'  This recasting of 
the familiar has a 'cognitive' purpose, that is, the recognition of reality it 
evokes from the reader is a gain in rational understanding of the social 
conditions of existence. (115)
In Reading by Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction, Damien Broderick explains,
The strategy of estrangement uses one thing as a figure or stand-in for 
another (as metaphor does: 30 Heads of State), which is the mechanism of 
poetry and allegory.  Usually, prose fictions employ a strategy of 
metonymy, based on causality, contiguity, or 'combination'--the syntagm or 
unfolding word-string--or synecdoche (part standing for whole: 30 head of 
cattle).  The allegorising of sf, however, also differs from most poetry, 
which is both strategically and tactically metaphoric.  Sf's special strategy 
yields a preeminent ontological saturation or intensity, of a kind that 
everyday metonymic narrative can never sustain--and yet it remains 
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anchored in the natural or empirical.  (34)
Suvin's book, then, formulates science fiction (at least good sf) as a critical genre.  This 
concept was later advanced by Carl Howard Freedman, who, in his book Critical Theory 
and Science Fiction, states that "[j]ust as Lukacs argues that the historical novel is a 
privileged and paradigmatic genre for Marxism, so I argue that science fiction enjoys--
and ought to be recognized as enjoying--such a position not only for Marxism but for 
critical theory in general" (xv).  Further,
I maintain that science fiction, like critical theory, insists upon historical 
mutability, material reductability, and utopian possibility.  Of all genres, 
science fiction is thus the one most devoted to the historical concreteness 
and rigorous self-reflectiveness of critical theory.  The science fictional 
world is not only one different in time or place from our own, but one 
whose chief interest is precisely the difference that such difference makes. 
(Freedman XVI)
Science fiction, then, has a long history in some corners of the academic realm as a 
privileged mode of social and critical inquiry.  It is in this tradition that I will be 
examining the works of Philip K. Dick, hoping to show the truth of this claim regarding 
science fiction and to also show Dick's privileged position within science fiction itself--in 
particular, in his relationship to postmodern culture.
2. Postmodernism
As is the case with science fiction, much of the discourse surrounding postmodernism is 
focused on defining exactly what it is.  Just as I have sought to use "canonical" texts to 
define science fiction, so here a renowned study will be used for the explaining of the 
term: Fredric Jameson's Postmodernism.1  To simplify things to an extent Jameson would 
no doubt frown upon: the book's basic thesis is that postmodernism is the form that the 
superstructure takes when the base (to use a Marxist formulation) has become almost 
1   Here is, perhaps, the place to address the concern that a tautological argument is being set up; that by 
using Marxist texts to define both major topics they will inevitably agree.  The inclusion of Brian McHale 
is one attempt to broaden this paper's discourse; however, this problem is also by-and-large unavoidable, as 
the most interesting and fruitful discussions of both postmodernism and science fiction from a cultural 
studies and/or critical theory background all seem to be Marxian to some degree.
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completely mechanized (and computerized) multinationalism.  This is evident when 
Jameson parallels three fundamental moments of capitalism (market capitalism, 
monopoly/imperialism, multinationalism) with three cultural periods (realism, 
modernism, postmodernism) (35-36).   Jameson's view of postmodernism is "one that 
seeks to grasp it as the cultural dominant of the logic of late capitalism" (46), which 
means that it is only useful to identify art as postmodern if it seems to have a relationship 
with consumerist, multinational society.  "Late capitalism," as Jameson calls it, includes 
features such as "transnational business, international division of labour, a vertiginous 
new dynamic in international banking and the stock exchanges … new forms of media 
interrelationship … computers and automation, the flight of production to advanced Third 
World areas … crisis of traditional labour, the emergence of yuppies, and gentrification 
on a now-global scale" (xix).  These changes (from modernity to postmodernity) in the 
economic "base" lead to similar changes in the cultural superstructure.  Damien 
Broderick provides a helpful list of "postmodern tropes" which he has isolated from 
Jameson's Postmodernism:
a certain flatness, a lack of mimetic or illusory "depth"; loss or attenuation 
of discrete subjectivity and memory, yielding an odd blend of flattened 
affect and "a peculiar kind of euphoria"; the abandonment by the artist of 
any pretence to a unique style localized in history, in favor of pastiche, 
jargon, and nostalgia; schizophrenic écriture, especially jumbled collage 
and a radical breakdown in reality-testing; the "hysterical sublime." 
(Broderick 10)
Christopher Palmer adds, "The term 'postmodern' is introduced partly in response to the 
preoccupation of late capitalism with fabrication, exchange and sale of images rather than 
artefacts; the commodification of culture.  The economic and the cultural have become 
intermingled.  Further, it is often alleged that postmodernity does something quite drastic 
and unprecedented to history: it erases it" (4).  All of this extensive quoting is to show 
that those features generally associated with postmodernity, from Lyotard and Baudrillard 
to Pynchon and DeLillo, can in fact be seen as "symptoms" of late capitalism.  This will 
be better explained when dealing directly with Dick's work.
Before turning to Dick's work, though, a specific look should be taken at 
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postmodern literature.  In Postmodernist Fiction, Brian McHale identifies the major split 
between modernist and postmodernist fiction as a movement from an epistemological 
dominant to an ontological one (9-10).  The main difference between the two, the 
epistemological and the ontological, is that the former assumes a stable world, and 
questions the role of man and systems within it, while the latter denies the existence of a 
stable, authentic world.
Far from being two different conceptions of postmodernism, Jameson's and 
McHale's theories can work together, in that the economic base of advanced consumerism 
and multinationalism creates a superstructure, an ideology, where the focus or dominant 
turns to ontological questions rather than epistemological ones (which were prevalent 
when the economic base was monopoly/imperialist capitalism).  After all, McHale is 
diagnosing literature, an aspect of culture, which Jameson (and Marxists like him) 
connect with the economic realm.  Dick taps into the fact that "[t]he ontology of the 
human and the ontology of the world mutually construct each other.  When one is fake, 
the other is contaminated by fakery as well; when one is authentic, the authenticity of the 
other is, if not guaranteed, at least held out as a strong possibility" (Hayles 423).  It is, 
perhaps, Dick's focus on the concept of authenticity that allows Damien Broderick to 
make that claim that "following Fredric Jameson and Brian McHale, Dick is the 
inevitable exemplar of postmodern ontological fiction" (Philip K. Dick and Transrealism 
10).  
3. Authenticity
One of the paradigmatic issues of postmodernism is the problem of authenticity, 
even if that specific term is not always used.  In its Derridian, post-structuralist strain, 
postmodernism calls into question the validity of truth-claims, reveals that the connection 
between language and what it signifies is largely arbitrary, and seeks to show that what 
were formerly viewed as universal truths are, in fact, cultural or linguistic constructs--
what some theorists call ideology.  In feminist criticism, postmodernism leads away from 
the formerly "gendered" discourse and towards the likes of Judith Butler and "queer 
theory," with its de-emphasis of something as basic as anatomy as providing an important 
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distinction between people.  In the commercial realm, mass production, the creation of 
suburbs, and technology such as the Internet moves away from products that are 
handmade or unique, and moves towards a world of replication and sameness.   Jameson 
says of this economic aspect of postmodernism that "the culture of the simulacrum comes 
to life in a society where exchange value has been generalized to the point at which the 
very memory of use value is effaced, a society which Guy Debord has observed, in an 
extraordinary phrase, that in it 'the image has become the final form of commodity 
reification'" (Jameson 18).  All of these aspects of postmodernism lead to a distrust or 
devaluation of the "authentic," the idea that something is "original, first-hand, 
prototypical"; "real, actual, genuine; really proceeding from its reputed source or author"; 
"of undisputed origin; possessing original or inherent authority" ("authentic, a. (and n.)," 
OED).  Walter Benjamin, in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction," a classic essay which deals with just this issue, states that "the presence of 
the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity … the whole sphere of 
authenticity is outside technical--and, of course, not only technical--reproducibility. 
Confronted with its manual reproduction, which was usually branded as a forgery, the 
original reserved its authority; not so vis a vis technical reproduction" (222).  This is to 
say that the authentic thing has inherent value or meaning--it has a privileged connection 
to the "real" that is not present in fakes, forgeries, copies, simulations, simulacra, and so 
on.  The crisis of foundationalism brought about by postmodernity calls into question the 
authenticity of God, of true communication, of the male/female split, etc., and the search 
for such "authenticity" can be branded as logocentrism.  The problem, however, is that 
authenticity, or some connection to the Real, or Truth, (or the Sublime) is seemingly 
necessary for communication, or is at least highly desired by humans, who feel the need 
for a deeper truth than the world of surface images we live in.  For instance, Derrida, in 
his later writings, turned towards discussions of God--even the "high priest" of 
postmodernism needed to look for meaning somewhere.
The works of Philip K. Dick follow a similar pattern; within them can be found a 
powerful criticism of late capitalist society, and a discourse on the problem of 
authenticity.  Just as Dick calls into question the authenticity of every aspect of the 
world--history, mankind, reality itself--so too does he seem to come to cherish the idea of 
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authenticity more and more, so that his last few novels turn to an investigation of god. 
Even in this final instance, though, Dick calls such an Ultimate authenticity into question. 
So, to recapitulate our findings: (1) that "good" science fiction acts as a form of 
social and cultural critique, however estranged and weird it may seem; and (2) that 
postmodernism can best be understood as the dominant social system, from the 1950s 
onward.  The following, then, will be an attempt to show that the works of Philip K. Dick 
are intrinsically occupied with the problem of authenticity, and form a particularly strong 
critique of late capitalist society, that they engage in the postmodern tropes identified 
above, and in doing so make Dick the paradigmatic author of both late twentieth-century 
science fiction and postmodernism itself.
PHILIP K DICK
Kim Stanley Robinson, an award-winning science fiction author,  had this to say about 
science fiction in his PhD thesis, entitled The Novels of Philip K. Dick:
If … the distortions and estrangements that constitute the elements of 
science fiction are made systematically, with an underlying metaphorical 
purpose, the genre can become a powerful instrument of social criticism. 
Used in this way its distortions become somewhat like the exaggerations 
and the use of the grotesque in satire, which is surely one of the genres 
from which science fiction was born.
   Philip K. Dick's science fiction is perhaps the best example of the 
estranging element of the genre being organized and used for this critical 
purpose.  (Robinson X)
Christopher Palmer, author of Philip K. Dick: Exhilaration and Terror of the Postmodern, 
agrees with Robinson, seeing Dick as a SF writer who writes about the postmodern 
condition and its affect on the human subject: "Dick's fiction constitutes a radical 
representation of the conditions of contemporary society, conditions that affect the sense 
of time, the sense of self which an individual is required to attain in order to be an agent 
in contemporary society, the sense of objects as they are produced by contemporary 
society" (Palmer 10).  Further: "All these factors and conditions constitute a critique of 
postmodern society as a threat to the liberal humanist individual, who depends on a sense 
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of sequential time, on the differences between himself and others--or himself and other 
beings with consciousness--and on the real existence of objects" (Palmer 24).  Dick uses 
the estrangements of sf to perform a critical act, like satire, on contemporary, postmodern 
society. 
There is a short story by Philip K. Dick entitled "Pay for the Printer" (1954) 
which can be seen as paradigmatic of not only his opus, but of his relationship to the kind 
of critical social criticism identified by Robinson.  "Pay for the Printer," like many 
science fiction stories that came before it and would succeed it, depicts the world 
recovering from nuclear holocaust.  In this future society mankind is barely able to scrape 
by, with all industry having been destroyed during the war, a war which is never truly 
described.  
Luckily for humanity, help has come from the heavens: the Biltong, an alien race 
with strange and useful powers, is attracted to the Earth by the flashing lights of the 
erupting nuclear warheads.  These gelatinous creatures have the ability to copy--print, in 
the story's language--anything put before them, and in affable fashion they offer their 
talents to stricken humanity.  Communities blossom around these Biltong, which seem 
rather immobile, despite having travelled to Earth from afar (or perhaps the Biltong 
originally set down in well-populated areas).  The important thing is that the Biltong 
become the center of each post-apocalyptic enclave, and serve the function of 
(re)producing everything that can no longer be produced by man.  Man seems to have lost 
the knowledge of how to create, since the war has destroyed so much industry and, 
presumably, the upper echelons of society.  Even more importantly (which is to say, more 
sinisterly), the story also seems to indicate that man loses this knowledge because the 
Biltong are so convenient.  Since the altruistic alien race is willing to make a copy of 
virtually anything that it is provided with, mankind simply forgets how to do it on its 
own.  
As the story begins, the reader learns that the Biltong are dying.  They have been 
on Earth too long, have copied too much for the thankless humans, and are most likely 
reacting badly to the fallout still present in the atmosphere.  Before any of the Biltong are 
physically represented in the text, the signs of their decay are made evident.  The physical 
world--that is, the world of buildings, of material objects, of things--is beginning to 
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decompose.  The power of entropy is present, and solid things are beginning to crumble, 
and, to use a popular term from Dick's later work, turn to kipple.  The reader learns that 
this is due to the plight of the Biltong who, now dying, can no longer make perfect 
replicas, but instead only frail and warped copies.  As the story progresses, it is revealed 
that this is not a local problem, but that it is happening to Biltong everywhere.
Without the Biltong's printing ability, the people of Earth do not know how to 
continue.  It is evident that while the nuclear holocaust that gave rise to this world was 
awful, the death of the Biltong will be even more debilitating.  Once the realization is 
made that the Biltong will leave Earth, since it would be suicidal to stay, one of the 
character's states: "Then our civilization goes with them" (252).  It is worth noting that 
civilization did not go away with the dropping of the bombs years earlier.
The only hope in the story comes from a man named Dawes, who has done the 
unthinkable--he has actually built something himself: "Printing means merely copying.  I 
can't explain to you what building is; you'll have to try it yourself and find out.  Building 
and printing are two totally different things" (252).  And yet what he has built is crude.  A 
knife, a cup--nothing more than prehistoric men were capable of.  The knife gets an 
interesting reaction from the other characters: "The knife was as crude as the cup--
hammered, bent, tied together with wire.  'You made this knife?' Fergesson asked, dazed. 
'I can't believe it.  Where do you start?  You have to have tools to make this.  It's a 
paradox!'  His voice rose with hysteria.  'It isn't possible!'" (249).  This incredulous 
behaviour does not bode well for humanity, nor does Dawes' admission that things as 
complicated as cigarette lighters will be out of man's reach for a long time.  Still, there is 
a primitive hope, that man stripped of his material resources can somehow survive.
"Pay for the Printer" utilizes many of the motifs that recur throughout Dick's 
work.  It has the benign aliens, the Biltong, who do not, as in other science fiction, serve 
as an "other" for humanity (this spot is reserved, in Dick, for androids).  While Dick does 
not use aliens as often as other genre writers, when they do show up in his work they 
tend, like the Biltong, to be helpers--for instance, the slime-mould Lord Running Clam in 
Clans of the Alphane Moon.  The fact that Dick's aliens are often compassionate and 
helpful leads to the realization that his humans, for the most part, are not.
Present here, as well, is the handyman-as-hero.  Dawes, the one man capable of 
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making things himself, can be connected to the handymen heroes who populated the rest 
of Dick's work—such as Frank Frink in The Man in the High Castle (1962), who 
handicraft skills help reinvigorate a fallen world.  Also worth mentioning is the concept 
of a world battling entropy (especially prevalent in Do Androids Dream of Electric  
Sheep? (1968).  Most importantly, though, is Dick's criticism of the culture of 
consumerism and mass production.
While this story does not yet engage with postmodernism, it is an example of 
cultural criticism (by way of fantastic allegory), criticism directed at mass production and 
technology.  Dick's work tends towards the fully postmodern in his novels, where 
subjectivity, identity, schizophrenia, and other postmodern tropes discussed above can be 
more fully dealt with.  Here, though, in "Pay for the Printer," Dick's mode of criticism--
which he will use against postmodernist society in his other works--is in full force.
It does not take much of an interpretive stretch to see that the Biltong are acting in 
much the same ways that factories did in the 1950s.  The Biltong mass produce things, 
making inferior copies.  It brings to mind a statement made by Robinson, in a BBC 
documentary entitled Philip K. Dick: A Day in the Afterlife: 
What you would notice if you were Philip K. Dick is that there's nothing 
natural in the world anymore.  Everything that I see is plastic and glass and 
gaudy colours, and strangely made.  Human beings begin to take on an odd 
look.  Our clothes are the same sort of plastic oddness, and therefore our 
eyeballs begin to take on kind of a glassy look.  The entire world begins to 
take on a kind of a fake, artificial "made" quality, and the question then 
naturally jumps to your mind: well, who made it?  Why is it so crummy? 
Why is it so degraded and falling apart? (Philip K. Dick: A Day in the 
Afterlife) 
It is the tyranny of sameness, by way of the subjugation of authenticity.  What is 
authentic is difficult to make, like the knife and cup produced by Dawes, but it has an 
almost transcendental quality, as can be seen in Fergesson's disbelieving reaction to them. 
The rareness and sublimity of the authentic will be returned to again and again 
throughout Dick's opus.
Similarly, it is not much of a stretch to see that a Marxian idea of alienation is at 
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work, where mankind is so alienated from its labour that the possibility of survival is 
hamstrung.  Mankind becomes useless, since it has become disconnected from the 
production of the things it requires to survive, and any chance of a revolutionary break--
seemingly necessary in such a post-apocalyptic society--is drastically diminished. In 
showing this act of alienation, Dick's work "recognizes a fundamental contradiction of 
late capitalism.  In the words of economist Ernest Mandel: 'Capitalist automation as the 
mighty development of both the productive forces of labor and the alienating and 
destructive forces of commodity and capital thus becomes the quintessence of the 
antimonies inherent in the capitalist mode of production'" (Bukatman 52-53).
As mentioned, Dick's brand of social criticism becomes postmodern in many of 
his novels.  To give three examples: In The Simulacra (1964), characters are plagued by 
"Nitz advertisements," fly-sized machines that infiltrate cars and homes--the same way 
flies would--and buzz out inane commercials (41).  This is a particularly clever invention 
of Dick's, comparing advertisements to pests, in both the annoyance they cause and their 
pervasiveness.  In The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch (1964), Dick uses a common 
science fiction trope--the precognitive psychic (or "precog").  Whereas in other works of 
SF precogs are known to use their powers to produce enigmatic prophecies, or to warn 
against doom, or are used as a means to send the main character on a perilous adventure 
to beat fate, in Palmer Eldritch the main occupation for precogs is as advisors to the 
commercial sphere.  In our world, corporations must employ focus and research groups to 
see if a new product will sell; in Palmer Eldritch, a precog can use his or her psychic 
powers to see within seconds if the same item is viable.  Lastly, in Ubik, the novel's 
protagonist, Joe Chip, is unable to leave his apartment until paying his door five cents for 
the service; an argument ensues, as to whether the charge represents a mandatory fee or a 
gratuity (23-24).  Joe even threatens to undo the door's hinges with a knife, and in 
response the door threatens to sue.
Each of these three examples (the Nitz advertisements, the capitalistic precogs, 
the greed of the automated door to Joe Chip's apartment) are good examples of the sort of 
criticism Dick levels against capitalist society.  They are postmodern--or at least, more 
postmodern than the criticism in "Pay for the Printer"--to the extent that they go beyond 
criticizing the mere mass production of modernism and show the total saturation of 
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commercialism and consumerism in everyday life. The realm of capital can no longer be 
separated from any other aspect of human life.  In Palmer Eldritch and Ubik, Dick shows 
religion reduced to a consumer item: in the former, salvation comes in the form of a drug, 
Chew-Z, with the slogan "GOD PROMISES ETERNAL LIFE.  WE CAN DELIVER IT" 
(150); in the latter novel, the forces of entropy and decay can only be delayed through the 
application of "Ubik," which appears as an aerosol spray and even a magic elixir, and is 
advertised throughout the novel in the epigraphs to each chapter.  Dick thus reflects on 
the form of late capitalism which has invaded and annexed all other areas of life.
Such criticisms by themselves, however, might not truly qualify the novels for the 
label "postmodern," if it were not for the fact that in each of these works the criticisms of 
consumer culture are accompanied by a narrative focus on problems of ontology.  So in 
The Simulacra the government is revealed as a sham; the First Lady is an actress, and the 
President is not only not elected democratically, as everyone believes, but is also a 
simulacrum.  The characters of the novel continually have their faith in the system 
undermined, as more and more of the world is revealed to be a fabrication.  As Patricia 
Warrick has argued, "Dick's fiction is structured as a series of reversals designed to defeat 
the reader's expectation that it is possible to discover what the situation 'really' is" (Hayles 
431).  Palmer Eldritch and Ubik both contain an event (the taking of Chew-Z in the former, 
an explosion on the moon in the latter) which alters both the characters' and the reader's 
perception of what is real; after this event, both the reader and the characters are never 
sure if they are living in a world of perception or in a "real" world.  Dick's criticisms of 
advanced consumerism are accompanied by a focus on ontology, seemingly in 
accordance with Jameson's and McHale's understanding of postmodernity and 
postmodern writing.  As Broderick puts it, Dick's work constitutes “the preeminent 
staging of postmodern tropes identified by Fredric Jameson,” (10).  So it is that "the 
prevalence of paranoia and schizophrenia in Dick's works illustrates the impact of 
capitalism on the human subject" (Enns 68), and the nature (or symptoms) of this impact 
leads to ontological problems and the staging of postmodern tropes.  
This thesis, then, will show that Dick's work engages in a specifically postmodern 
cultural criticism that is closely engaged with the problem of authenticity.  What is held 
up as authentic, or considered valuable by Dick, is always something that, to some 
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degree, resists the forces of consumerism, or is somehow unaffected by mass 
reproduction.  Dick's methods will be examined in detail in the following chapters, which 
comprise close readings of his most critically successful novel, The Man in the High 
Castle (1962), and his most commercially successful novel, Do Androids Dream of  
Electric Sheep?(1968).  Not only are these novels Dick's most important works, but a 
progression can be witnessed in them, a progression from the problems of authentic 
history found in High Castle to the problems of authentic humanity found in Androids. 
The novels are not merely different takes on the problem of authenticity, but show how 
Dick found the entire concept increasingly problematic—and transcendent—as his career 
progressed. 
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Chapter 1
The Man in the High Castle
"Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and 
space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be." 
-Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"
The Man in the High Castle is Philip K. Dick's masterpiece.  It contains his most fully 
fleshed-out characters, a mastery of style, and a unity of theme and action that are often 
absent from his work.  Kim Stanley Robinson notes that the writing of High Castle took 
at least a year, which is a marked change from Dick's usual writing habits--before he 
averaged about two novels a year, and for the next four years after High Castle his output 
was even more prolific.  In this book, which would go on to win him the Hugo Award, the 
science-fiction genre's highest honor, Dick "combined the attention to characterization, 
and quality of prose, that he had given to the realist novels, with the estrangements of his 
science fiction, and the result was one of the very first great American science fiction 
novels" (Robinson 39).  As well as being an engrossing piece of popular fiction, High 
Castle is a deeply ontological exercise, and one of Dick's most postmodern works.
America has been defeated by the Axis powers.  This concept is the basis for 
Dick's High Castle.  However, rather than using this particular novum to launch into a 
"what if?" scenario, Dick uses it instead to stage an estranging effect on his readers, and 
in doing so causes them to question the very idea of history, of fiction, of human action, 
and--most important to this study--the concept of authenticity; which is to say, Dick's 
novel coerces the reader into considering ontological problems, which fits Freedman's 
previously-stated claim that "the science fictional world is not only one different in time 
or place from our own, but one whose chief interest is precisely the difference that such 
difference makes" (Freedman XVI).  
The US has been partitioned: the East coast is run by a Nazi-controlled 
government, while the West coast has become the Pacific States of America (the PSA), 
part of the Co-Prosperity Alliance, governed by the Empire of Japan.  Of the four central 
characters, three--Robert Childan, Frank Frink, and Mr. Tagomi--are living in the PSA; in 
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San Francisco, to be exact.  The fourth, Juliana Frink, lives in the Rocky Mountain States, 
a buffer-zone between the coasts that is "loosely banded to the PSA" (9).  These 
characters are separated by class--Tagomi is a bigwig in the Japanese Trade Commission, 
Childan is a middle-class business owner, and the Frinks are blue collar--and also by their 
use of language.  Tagomi and the Kasouras, the Japanese characters of the novel, speak 
an English that is heavily affected by Japanese idioms ("Intuition about people.  Cut 
through all ceremony and outward form.  Penetrate to the heart," etc.), whereas the 
American characters speak an English that is more or less significantly altered, depending 
on how immersed each character is in the Japanese-American culture.  This is, perhaps, 
the most admirable stylistic achievement of Dick's fiction:
But in The Man in the High Castle Dick intends to write an English 
transformed by a Japanese occupation; not just the pulp language of Mr. 
Moto, but an expressive, compressed, epigrammatic English, evocative as 
a haiku or Zen koan.  He varies this voice depending upon the viewpoint 
character of any given scene.  In Tagomi's scenes we see it at its purest. 
Childan is deliberately trying to think Japanesed English, so he slips in and 
out of it; Frink doesn't try, but he is profoundly influenced by the I Ching, 
and he falls into it as the dialect of his time. (Robinson 49)
With Juliana Frink, removed, as she is, from the PSA, the "Japanesed English" disappears 
completely.  This defamiliarized English is not an attempt at an "authentic" Japanese 
accent; rather, Dick presents the reader with something familiar--a common language--
and creates an estranging effect, making the familiar seem alien.  This deformation of 
style corresponds to the way Dick manages his central theme in High Castle: the 
engagement with history.  High Castle is a perfect example of a postmodern treatment of 
history (see, for example, Jameson 2005, 345).  Dick further explores history by adding 
two extra complications: the first is a novel-within-the-novel, The Grasshopper Lies  
Heavy; the second is Robert Childan's American Authentic Handicrafts Inc. and the 
proliferation of fake or "inauthentic" pieces of history found there. 
The Grasshopper Lies Heavy is a novel written by Hawthorne Abendsen, the man 
in the high castle of the novel.  A character in High Castle informs the reader that the title 
of Abendsen's book is a quote from the Bible; in particular, the line seems to allude to 
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Ecclesiastes 12:52.   This novel depicts an alternate history, one in which the Allies, not 
the Axis, were victorious in WWII.  In a bit of postmodern reflexivity, Paul Kasoura and 
his wife discuss the nature of the novel: 
'Interesting form of fiction possibly within genre of science fiction."
   "Oh no," Betty disagreed.  "No science in it.  Nor set in future.  Science 
fiction deals with future, in particular future where science has advanced 
over now.  Book fits neither premise."
   "But," Paul said, "it deals with alternative present.  Many well-known 
science fiction novels of that sort." (108)
This conversation, of course, leads the reader to think about High Castle; it, too, is a 
science fiction novel, depicting an alternate history, and Paul's comments seem to 
acknowledge this with a sly wink to the reader. 
  The initial description of Grasshopper informs the reader that in it, Franklin 
Roosevelt was not assassinated.  Since Dick is already representing an alternate history, 
and since, in the reader's time, Roosevelt was not assassinated, the most likely first 
assumption is that the history depicted in The Grasshopper Lies Heavy is the reader's 
own.  The question remains: which is the authentic history?  While this question could 
first be put to the text itself--as in, which fictional history fits this fictional world?--the 
continuous complications presented by Dick lead the reader to pose this question to their 
own history, thus engaging in the distrust of meta-narratives common to postmodernism 
in general.  
The Grasshopper Lies Heavy, with its seemingly familiar take on history, is one of 
the key ways in which Dick acts out this investigation into, and ultimate realization of, 
postmodern and consumerist ideology.  As High Castle progresses, more and more of the 
content of the novel-within-the-novel is described, and it becomes evident that the history 
of that novel is also different from the reader's own, is yet another alternate history. The 
world is divided between the US and the UK, who engage in a sort of "Cold War" 
reminiscent of the US/USSR conflict post-WWII.  In The Grasshopper Lies Heavy, 
Winston Churchill, in the victorious aftermath of WWII, becomes ensconced in his 
2    Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way, and the almond tree 
shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail: because man goeth to his long 
home, and the mourners go about the streets
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position of power, is able to maintain his place as Prime Minister, and "the older he gets, 
the more autocratic and rigid he gets … until by 1960, he's like some old warlord out of 
Central Asia; nobody can cross him" (161).  Joe Cinnadella, explaining the novel to 
Juliana, tells her that the British "start setting up … what are called 'detention preserves.' 
Concentration camps, in other words.  For thousands of maybe disloyal Chinese.  They're 
accused of sabotage and propaganda" (High Castle 160).  According to Grasshopper, 
"under British rule, the darker races were excluded from the country clubs, the hotels, the 
better restaurants," whereas in the US "the color problem had by 1950 been solved" 
(159).  By the end of the novel, the US is defeated, and the new, authoritarian Britain 
rules the world.
  At the end of High Castle, Juliana confronts Hawthorne Abendsen, the author of 
Grasshopper.  As she travels to his home, the fabled "High Castle," she asks herself: 
"What is it Abendsen wanted to say?  Nothing about his make-believe world … he told us 
about our own world" (248-249)--a realization that Dick hopes his readers will come to 
as well.  Upon arriving in Cheyenne, Juliana discovers that the "High Castle" is, in fact, 
"a single-story stucco house with many shrubs and a good deal of garden made up mostly 
of climbing roses" (251), one of the many ways in which expectations and surface are 
shown to be false in the novel.  She learns that Abendsen wrote his book by using the I  
Ching, calling on the Book of Changes for how to write all aspects of it (256).  When 
Juliana questions the I Ching regarding its motivation for writing the book, she receives 
the hexagram for Inner Truth (257).  Juliana and Abendsen take this to mean that 
Grasshopper is true, that the Axis really did lose the War.  However, the reader knows 
that even if the novel-within-a-novel is correct in that regard, it still has the facts wrong.
The confusion between authentic histories is further advanced if a reader has 
some knowledge of Dick's autobiography.  Dick wrote High Castle by using the I Ching 
at every step.  If it was not already clear, this bit of information makes it abundantly 
evident that Abendsen is to Grasshopper what Dick is to High Castle.  Dick and 
Abendsen are conflated, as when Joe warns Juliana not to get mixed up with Abendsen: 
"I don't want you getting mixed up with him--you know.  That would be dreadful.  Wreck 
everyone's existence" (High Castle 164).  What at first seems like a comment about social 
mores turns out to be infused with ontological power.  Patricia Warrick writes that "an 
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equation is established in which Dick's novel is to the real world what Abendsen's novel 
is to Dick's fictional reality.  The winner of any war is locked into the necessity of 
continuing to fight to maintain his superior power position.  The effort eventually 
destroys him.  On a moral level, he has already been destroyed because of the horrendous 
acts he committed to win.  The winner paradoxically is the loser" (Warrick 87).
But the questions about history begin even earlier in the narrative, with the first-
page introduction of Robert Childan and American Artistic Handicrafts Inc.  Childan's 
shop contains "no contemporary American art," he tells us; "Only the past could be 
represented here, in a store such as this" (5).  It would perhaps be more informative, for 
this discussion, to change the wording, just a little bit: "the past could only be represented 
here," since the novel goes to great lengths to show that the artefacts in Childan's store--
or anywhere, for that matter--cannot contain history themselves, but rather can only hope 
to represent the past, no matter how imperfectly.  On top of that, many of the historical 
items in Childan's store, if not all of them, are forgeries.  
Robert Childan makes his living by selling "authentic" American artefacts to his 
wealthy Japanese clients.  What is deemed to be "authentically" American is, in itself, a 
form of social criticism.  Guns, especially the recurring Colt .44, seem to be a big part of 
America's past, but it is a Mickey Mouse watch that is deemed the "most authentic of 
dying old U. S. culture" (44); a statement which certainly acts as a criticism, if America's 
culture is intimately linked to a cartoon mouse.  Other items in Childan's store include a 
scrimshaw, vegetable-dyed goat-hair rugs, and a framed signed picture of Jean Harlowe--
all of which, it turns out, may be forgeries.  Childan's store literalizes Palmer's (already-
stated) assertion that late capitalism is preoccupied with "fabrication, exchange and sale 
of images rather than artefacts; the commodification of culture.  The economic and the 
cultural have become intermingled" (Palmer 4).
At the outset of the novel, Frank Frink is fired from his job in the W-M 
Corporation, where  he was employed as a forger.  Frink himself manufactures the fake 
American artefacts found in Childan's store.  His specialty is small arms from the frontier 
period, and the Colt .44 will turn up again and again in the novel, linked, by the reader's 
knowledge of its origins, to Frink, and thus to the concept of fakery.  After Frink is fired, 
he decides to tell Robert Childan that many of his artefacts are fake; he does so, in 
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disguise, by revealing to Childan the nature of one of his Colt .44s.  Childan later learns 
that there is a whole industry at work turning out fakes (58).
Dick uses the idea of "fake" historical artefacts to interrogate the idea of "real" or 
"authentic" historical artefacts, and to call into question the very existence of what he 
calls "historicity" (Dick's term-- "when a thing has history in it") itself.  In essence, he 
deconstructs the idea of "historicity." He does this by including historical artefacts that 
are either counterfeit in their design (the Colt .44)--and are thus new rather than 
"historical"--or which make dubious claims to historical importance (such as the Zippo 
lighter, discussed below).  This is most clearly done in an important exchange between 
Wyndham-Matson and his mistress.  Wyndham-Matson is Frank Frink's boss; he is the 
character who has the most authority over (and responsibility for) the reproduction of 
"fake" historical items.  After Wyndham-Matson is threatened with blackmail regarding 
the fraudulent nature of his historical artefacts, he engages in a demonstration for his 
paramour, in an attempt to show that "this whole damn historicity business is nonsense" 
(63).  He does this by asking her to compare two identical lighters:  
The girl gingerly picked up the two lighters and examined them.
   "Don't you feel it?" he kidded her.  "The historicity?"
   She said, "What is 'historicity'?"
   "When a thing has history in it.  Listen.  One of those two Zippo lighters 
was in Franklin D. Roosevelt's pocket when he was assassinated.  And one 
wasn't.  One has historicity, a hell of a lot of it. As much as any object ever 
had.  And one has nothing.  Can you feel it?"  He nudged her.  "You can't. 
You can't tell which is which.  There's no 'mystical plasmic presence,' no 
'aura' around it … It's all a big racket; they're playing it on themselves.  I 
mean, a gun goes through a famous battle, like Meuse-Argonne, and it's 
the same as if it hadn't, unless you know.  It's in here."  He tapped his head. 
"In the mind, not the gun … I'd have to prove it to you with some sort of 
document.  A paper of authenticity.  And so it's all a fake, a mass delusion. 
The paper proves its worth, not the object itself!"
   "Show me the paper."
   "Sure."  Hopping up, he made his way back into the study.  From the 
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wall he took the Smithsonian Institution's framed certificate; the paper and 
the lighter had cost him a fortune, but they were worth it--because they 
enabled him to prove that he was right, that the word "fake" meant nothing 
really, since the word "authentic" meant nothing really. (63-64)
This excerpt is significant to the novel as a whole, and to the concept of authenticity in 
particular.  What Wyndham-Matson explains is that "history" cannot be captured in a 
physical way.  A thing cannot "have history in it."   In the world of High Castle (and to a 
large extent our own), an item from any historical period can be almost perfectly 
duplicated, such as Frink's Civil War-era Colt .44, or Wyndham-Matson's Zippo lighter 
(though these two objects differ in their inauthenticity, which will be discussed shortly). 
When confronted with the original, historical object, and its exact duplicate, an 
unknowing observer cannot possibly tell the difference.  Wyndham-Matson himself 
cannot even tell the difference without a paper of authenticity, issued by the Smithsonian 
Institution (and thus authorized by a higher authority); but, as should be obvious to 
Wyndham-Matson, such a paper could be easily forged or duplicated.  George Slusser 
says of this section of the novel: "The lighter, then, makes historical claims to a world 
whose sense of history is dubious at best.  But by making them, it raises the question of 
what it means to make claims to historical status" (Slusser 204).  This is to say that the 
novel's revelations regarding history should push the reader into questioning their own 
connection to history.  The fact of the matter is that, once duplication and reproduction 
have been perfected, there is no objective way to discern the original from the "fake." 
"Historicity" cannot be felt, or weighed, or sussed out in any other fashion.  
What this means is that "historicity" is a false sort of authenticity.  Authenticity 
cannot survive duplication--the copy will always be lacking.  This is not the case with 
"historicity," since Wyndham-Matson's demonstration clearly shows that the original and 
the duplicate cannot be differentiated.  As such, "historicity" is revealed to be non-
existent--it makes overtures towards authenticity, but this sort of authenticity does not 
exist in the object, only in the mind of the subject.  
Wyndham-Matson's demonstration can be compared to some of the points made 
by Walter Benjamin in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction."  In it, Benjamin states, "The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all 
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that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its 
testimony to the history which it has experienced.  Since the historical testimony rests on 
the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive duration 
ceases to manner ... the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from 
the domain of history" (223).  Benjamin and Wyndham-Matson are certainly discussing 
the same thing, though their conclusions are somewhat different.  Both agree that a 
reproduced item cannot have authenticity; where they disagree is in their conception of 
the original item's connection to history.  Benjamin believes that the original is intimately 
linked with its historical context, and that the reproduced item is divorced from it. 
Wyndham-Matson's (postmodern) point is that history ("historicity") does not exist either 
in the reproduction or the original.  "Historicity" exists inside of the mind, as is evident 
later in the novel when Tagomi considers returning the Colt .44 he has used to kill a Nazi 
thug ("trade the gun in on more historicity sanctioned item.  This gun, for me, has too 
much subjective history … no one else can experience it from the gun.  Within my 
psyche only" [223]).  "Historicity" simply does not exist--it is an epistemological 
problem, a trick of the mind, but one with ontological implications--and therefore cannot 
be used as a signifier of authenticity.  This is to say that "historicity" cannot be a stand-in 
for "aura" which, in Benjamin's formulation, is a sort of transcendent authenticity.  In 
High Castle, the more appropriate stand-in for Benjamin's aura is "wu," something that is 
lacking in Wyndham-Matson's fake historical artefacts.   
What the discourse on Benjamin indicates, and what Wyndham-Matson's role as a 
mass producer of fake artefacts reinforces, is that the problem of authenticity is 
exacerbated by the forces of capitalist mass production (and, in the current era, computer-
driven and globalized reproduction).  This is to say that the problem of originals, of 
duplication and "aura," always existed, but with the advances in technology the problem 
becomes endemic, an unavoidable part of postmodern culture.  Baudrillard's specifc 
formulation of the Simulacra, Debord's "society of the spectacle," Derrida's distrust of 
origins, and, of course, Dick's fictions, are all similar, in that they grapple with a concept 
here defined as authenticity.  If Jameson is right--and Dick's work seems to bear it out--
their common ground is historical (that is, economic) reality.  Palmer says of this 
economic reality, 
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In the modern regime of mass production, all products, being identical, are 
copies: fakes if you like.  There is no distinction between a working model 
of a toaster (say) and an 'authentic' toaster … Since all versions of a type 
of toaster are identical, none has identity … It is therefore possible to feel 
that you have no toaster; you have not a thing but an instance.  Certainly, 
this impression depends on the situation in which you find yourself; if this 
situation is such that you have to interrogate things for vital meanings, 
their lack of thingness is bound to bother you.  If you are not certain that 
you yourself are a person (that is, possessed of the continuity that makes 
for self), then the situation is worsened.  (19)
This last sentence is mostly relevant to the science-fictional ruminations of Dick 
(especially in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?), but the rest of Palmer's comments 
point to the fact that the economic realities of the postmodern historical moment lead to 
the sort of questions posed by postmodern theorists (Baudrillard, Derrida) and 
postmodern authors.  This mode of production leads to the posing of ontological 
questions, as noted by McHale, and to the postmodern literary tropes enumerated by 
Jameson.  It is obvious, from Wyndham-Matson's argument, and from the presence and 
discussion of fake (inauthentic) historical objects in the novel, that this relationship, 
between economic reality and postmodern meditations, was one to which Dick himself 
was deeply attuned.  
It needs to be mentioned that Tagomi's Colt .44 and the Zippo, however, are not 
exactly the same--that is to say, they differ in their inauthenticity.  The Zippo lighter 
purports to be related to a specific historical event--the assassination of Roosevelt--while 
the fake Colt .44 is purported to be of a certain age and era.  The level of fakery, in these 
instances, is different.  With the Zippo, for instance, a specific event of historical 
significance is pointed to.  The instance itself is a fictitious one (from the reader's point of 
view), adding a further layer of inauthenticity to the mix.  The Zippo lighter which was 
not found on Roosevelt when he was assassinated, however, may actually be a normal, 
mass produced Zippo, as "original" as the historically-authorized one.  With the Colt .44, 
on the other hand, no specific event is pointed to, and so in some way an entire historical 
era is accused of inauthenticity.  The Colt .44 certainly is not an actual Civil War-era Colt. 
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44, but is a contemporary fake.  Despite the difference in provenance, the two items 
jointly problematize the past.  Whether it is a big historical event, or a bygone era, the 
idea that an item can actually refer to, or contain, history is cast into question.  For the 
Colt .44, this question arises from the nature of its construction--that it is a replica--while 
with the Zippo it is more a matter of its actual lineage--the authenticity of its "historical 
testimony."  However, considering that Wyndham-Matson is the boss of the very 
company that produces historical forgeries like the Colt .44, it stands to reason that he 
grasps how the problem of "historicity" attached to the Zippo can be turned into a 
profitable line of consumer replicas, preying on the consumer's inability to identify 
"historicity" as a false sort of authenticity.
Childan's response to the revelation that his store is filled with forgeries is 
explicitly stated: 
Bit of knowledge like that goes a long way.  Akin to primal childhood 
awakening; facts of life.  Shows, he ruminated, the link with our early 
years: not merely U.S. history involved, but our own personal.  As if, he 
thought, question might arise as to authenticity of our birth certificate.  Or 
our impression of Dad.
   Maybe I don't actually recall F.D.R. as example.  Synthetic image 
distilled from hearing assorted talk.  Myth implanted subtly in tissue of 
brain. (High Castle 142-143)
Childan connects history to memory, the macro and the micro.  Hopefully, this link leads 
readers to consider their own history.  Once memory fades, history only lives on in 
records and objects; but, with the advances in technology, both records and objects can be 
manufactured.  Once history is bereft of transcendental signifiers, all that remains is 
history as ideology.  This is as true in High Castle as it is in the real world.  
Since "historicity" is revealed to be fictive, something else must be sought after to 
function as a gauge of authenticity.  This "something else" is found in the piece of 
Edfrank jewellery, and is identified by Paul Kasoura as "wu," in a passage that must be 
quoted at length:  
Here is a piece of metal which has been melted until it has become 
shapeless.  It represents nothing.  Nor does it have design, of any 
23
intentional sort.  It is merely amorphous.  One might say, it is mere 
content, deprived of form.
   …I feel a certain emotional fondness … It has separated from [the 
universe] and hence has managed to come to homeostasis … Robert, this 
object has wu … It is complete, Robert.  By contemplating it, we gain 
more wu ourselves.  We experience the tranquility associated not with art 
but with holy things … This is alive in the now … I have come to identify 
the value which this has in opposition to historicity … To have no 
historicity … It is a religious experience … an entire new world is pointed 
to, by this.  The name for it is neither art, for it has no form, nor religion. 
What is it?  I have pondered this pin increasingly, and yet cannot fathom it. 
We evidently lack the word for an object like this … It is authentically a 
new thing on the face of the world."  (175-176, emphasis added)
By itself, wu is obviously a deficient stand-in for "historicity," since it is an equally vague 
and subjective term, and while it seems to be observable, at least to Paul Kasoura, there is 
even less possibility that it could be empirically verified.  John Hunting says of wu: 
[It is] a quality of balanced alignment with the universe.  Aura belongs to 
history and is liable to imitation and fraud; wu is an absolute aesthetic 
value, a universal outside of history, an intrinsic quality that cannot be 
imitated … While the scepticism about aura results in a debunking of the 
mystery of the 'authentic' piece, there seems to be a counter-urge at work 
which will replace the commercial mystery of historical authenticity with 
an equally mysterious and even less empirically certifiable absolute, wu. 
(Huntington 175)
In the novel, the real conflict is between "historicity" and wu as opposing criteria of 
authenticity.  Even if wu is a different sort of subjectivity, the way in which it differs 
needs to be examined.  
One of the important aspects about the wu-instilled jewellery is the method of its 
creation.  It is handwrought, and its shape came about naturally, without human 
interference: "Most of the pieces were abstract, whirls of wire, loops, designs which to 
some extent the molten metals had taken on their own" (High Castle 132).  It is because it 
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is not made from moulds, designed, or mass-produced, but instead shaped, in a sense, by 
the forces of nature that the Edfrank jewellery is imbued with wu.  But it is not simply a 
case of letting the metal take its own form--the jewellery does come from an artisan, and 
the shape, which may occur naturally, is still guided by the hand (versus the machines) of 
man.  Paul Kasoura says: "an artificer has put wu into the object, rather than merely 
witnessed the wu inherent in it" (176), which makes it different from Wyndham-Matson's 
forgeries. "It's in here … In the mind, not the gun" Wyndham-Matson says of 
"historicity," but Kasoura claims that the opposite is true with wu, that it exists outside of 
the mind, that it can exist within an object and, furthermore, that the hand of the artificer 
can place it there.  This represents an apotheosis of handicraft, of the blue-collar artistry 
that Frink and his partner represent, against the mass-produced faux-historic items that 
are churned out in an industrial fashion by the WM Corporation, solely for the purpose of 
profit.  
The conflict between the consumer-oriented industrial mode and the "authentic," 
wu-filled art of Edfrank Custom Jewellers is most dramatically played out in the scene 
quoted above, the interaction between Paul Kasoura and Robert Childan regarding the 
Edfrank jewellery.  After that piece of dialogue, Kasoura goes on to make an offer to 
Childan: "Pieces such as this … can be mass-produced.  Either in base metal or plastic. 
From a mould.  In any quantity desired" (179).  Such a process, Kasoura indicates, would 
make Childan rich.  Throughout the novel, Childan has been depicted as a money-hungry 
opportunist--in fact, he seems intent on cheating Edfrank of their jewellery--as well as a 
strident racist, and so the reader expects Childan to jump at the opportunity.  Instead, 
Childan asks: "What about wu?  Will that remain in the pieces?" (179).  Kasoura does not 
answer, and this makes Childan inexplicably hesitant.  He decides, briefly, on accepting 
the offer, but is overcome by a sense of shame.  In a remarkable turnabout, the profiteer 
Childan states, in his defamiliarized English, "I--am proud of this work.  There can be no 
consideration of trashy good-luck charms.  I reject … The men who made this … are 
American proud artists.  Myself included.  To suggest trashy good-luck charms therefore 
insults us and I ask for apology" (183).  While Childan's words can be interpreted as a 
face-saving gesture, a mere mimicry of the Japanese culture he loathes yet emulates, he is 
later found to be showing the Edfrank jewellery "ruthlessly to each of [his] customers" 
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(225).   
The significance of Childan's decision is not that he merely turns away from profit 
to embrace something without a sense of personal advancement, but that he allies himself 
with Edfrank and, more importantly, against the forces of consumerism and mass-
production, which Dick associates with Nazism (which will be discussed below).  This is 
a code that runs through the narrative: Childan, as we have just seen, is given the 
opportunity to align himself with consumerism, and refutes it, and Frink and McCarthy 
start their story by leaving WM Corporation, and create the wu-imbued jewellery.  Even 
one of the lesser characters, Baynes, who is working against the Nazis, distances himself 
from consumerism.  He has a cover job which he has given his alternate identity, a job in 
plastics, but he says of it: "no consumers' commodities" (38).  It seems important for 
Baynes to make this clear, especially to the enthusiastic Nazi to whom he is speaking. 
Tagomi and Juliana, the other main characters, are not described in relation to 
consumerism, but it is these two characters who directly (and violently) confront Nazism, 
and so the code, in their case, is not necessary.
To return to the Edfrank jewellery: as we have seen, Paul Kasoura states that "an 
entire new world is pointed to, by this," and Childan agrees.  When showing a piece of 
Edfrank jewellery to Tagomi, he claims: "This is the new life of my country, sir.  The 
beginning in the form of tiny imperishable seeds.  Of beauty … ...I sense accurately in 
these the contracted germ of the future" (225).  This seems to be part of what separates 
wu from "historicity"; while "historicity" makes claims to a dead past, wu points to the 
future.  Both wu and "historicity" are seen as different ways of engaging with history, 
with wu deemed by Dick to be the more authentic impulse, connecting it, perhaps, to 
Utopian yearning.  
The other impulse in the novel is symbolized by the Nazis.  Their relationship to 
history is different than either wu or "historicity"--theirs is the will to action, to death, and 
so an impulse that is anti-historical.  Patricia Warrick points out that some have found 
Dick "guilty of a political blunder in assuming a victorious Japanese fascism would be 
radically better than a German one" (Warrick 74).  Indeed, this sort of critique shows up 
in much of the criticism written about High Castle, and is often accompanied by the 
claim that Dick fetishizes Japanese culture.  While Dick is most likely guilty of this 
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second charge, at least to a certain degree, the first charge is often overstated.  Though the 
Japanese do not persecute the Jews as the Nazis do, it is shown to be business-as-usual 
for Jews to be deported to Germany.  While slavery may not exist in the Pacific States, a 
hierarchy based on race certainly does; for instance, when Robert Childan journeys to the 
Nippon Times Building (22-29), he uses a pedecab driven by a "chink."  His derogative 
use of this term seems to be less a comment on Childan's own racist beliefs (though there 
is certainly that) and more a statement of the position of the Chinese in the fictional 
society.  As well, Childan fears seeing a slave--not a slave from the PSA, but a "black" 
who may have arrived on a ship from the South or from Germany.  The implication is 
that, though slavery might not be a legal institution in the PSA, it is certainly acceptable, 
and slaves are still seen as the lowest form of society.  Elsewhere in the novel, comment 
is made about the "honkytonk jazz slums that made up most of the flat part of San 
Francisco, rickety tin and board shacks that had sprung up from the ruins even before the 
last bomb fell" (6).  Perhaps even more insidious is the off-hand comment regarding the 
"quaint old history-book days" (11), which may be a nostalgic description of the old days 
but which might also indicate that history books have been abolished.  All is not well in 
the Japanese-held USA, despite what some critics seem to think.
Another statement from Warrick is informative: "until the reader understands 
Nazism in the novel as more than Germany under Hitler, until he sees it as a symbol for 
all fascist drives to overpower and control … he has not explored the fullness of Dick's 
fictional history.  It is a work condemning every totalitarian drive--economic, political, 
and military" (74).  Warrick instructs the reader to see the Germans (and, to elaborate on 
this idea, the Japanese as well) as largely metaphoric, or symbolic characters.  This is to 
say that, while the Germans are Germans, and the Japanese are Japanese, both are 
imbued with meaning beyond their nationality.  The Nazis are actually detached from 
their history, since there is no attempt at understanding them in historical terms.  The 
Nazis are not seen as a  result of social or economic circumstances in Europe or 
understood as a political or cultural movement; instead, the Nazis are emblematic of the 
drive to totalitarianism and death.  In this sense, they are similar to the historical artefacts 
found in Childan's shop.  Since Dick's work is one of an alternate history to begin with, it 
should be seen as no great crime that he plays with the roles of the historical characters 
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within it.
As Warrick states, the Nazis are envisioned as representative of a totalitarian drive 
within humanity, one that leads, inevitably, towards death.  Warrick's position is that they 
are set up in opposition to the Japanese, and to the ideas of Taoism in particular.  This is, 
perhaps, an overly simplified reading.  In the novel, the Nazis are portrayed as more of a 
force than as a group; though they are represented by a few individual characters (Reiss, 
vom Meere), they exist in the novel more as an external threat (none of the action takes 
place in German-occupied land).  The Japanese, on the other hand, are represented less as 
a group, and more as individuals--in particular, Mr. Tagomi, and the Kasouras.  Both of 
them--the Kasouras in particular--are thought of as diverging from the dominant Japanese 
national character.  There is a good deal of 60s Orientalism involved as well.  Dick is 
more interested in the philosophical and spiritual ideas of the Japanese, which were 
gaining ground in the US during the 60s, than in their actual political systems.  Thus the 
focus on the I Ching and Tagomi's Zen-like demeanour.  The Japanese are not unlike the 
Biltong from “Pay for the Printer,” discussed in the introduction.  The opposition, then, is 
less one between the German principle and the Japanese principle, and more an 
opposition between the ever-present threat of Nazism and the individual, non-German 
characters of the novel.  Or, to be more specific, the conflict is between one drive towards 
the Real (the totalitarian drive to death in the Nazis) in opposition to another (the quest 
for authenticity, for wu, as enacted by the novel's main characters).
The Nazi quest for the Real is an inexplicable movement towards death, death as 
an absolute.  Baynes thinks of the Nazis: 
Their view; it is cosmic.  Not of a man here, a child there, but an 
abstraction: race, land.  Volk.  Land.  Blut.  Ehre.  Not of honourable men 
but of Ehre itself, honour; the abstract is real, the actual is invisible to 
them.  Die Gute, but not good men, this good man.  It is their sense of 
space and time.  They see through the here, the now, into the vast black 
deep beyond, the unchanging. (High Castle 41)  
The Nazi view moves beyond the realm of things, of images, towards something Real, 
something Absolute; or, the Nazi project attempts this movement, but the "Real" it leads 
to is always death.  This can be seen as a sort of "false" authenticity; though death is 
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certainly a total Reality, it is also obviously a negative one.  The Nazi drive to death is 
never-ending, as is obvious in a joke told in High Castle (the jokester being identified as 
a fugitive Bob Hope, hiding away in Canada): "This German major is interviewing some 
Martians.  The Martians can't provide racial documentation about their grandparents 
being Aryan, you know.  So the German major reports back to Berlin that Mars is 
populated by Jews" (79).  Reiss, one of the few Nazi characters in the novel, even agrees 
with this sentiment: "That Herr Hope is right, he thought.  With his joke about our contact 
on Mars.  Mars populated by Jews.  We would see them there, too.  Even with their two 
heads apiece, standing one foot high" (129).  Two chapters from a proposed sequel to 
High Castle were published in The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick (1996), edited by 
Lawrence Sutin; in them, Dick describes the Nazis of High Castle discovering a reality, 
one the seems similar to our (the readers') own.  It is quite evident that the Nazis will 
invade our reality as well, and another Holocaust will follow.  The promise of the Nazi 
project is an infinite regress of genocide; an eternal Holocaust.  Carl Freedman writes: 
In a way that strongly resonates with what Horkheimer and Adorno call 
the dialectic of enlightenment, the novel sees Nazi atrocity as the extreme 
but perfectly logical extension of something typically and profoundly 
Western: the valorization of ceaseless activity, of agency, of expansion and 
acquisition and domination--in sum, of that relentless imperialism of the 
subject, which would conquer and colonize all that is not itself, even at the 
ultimate and paradoxical price of reducing itself to insubstantiality and at 
last to nothingness. (Freedman 171) 
Furthermore, "It is not despite but rather because of the fact that the Nazis can have no 
definable goal short of universal holocaust, that they express more completely than 
anyone else in Western history the common but fatal preference for doing as against 
being, for the active as against the passive or copulative" (Freedman 171).  Joe 
Cinnadella explains this notion to Juliana, during their trip to Denver: "Listen, I'm not an 
intellectual--Fascism has no need of that.  What is wanted is the deed.  Theory derives 
from action.  What our corporate state demands from us is comprehension of the social 
forces--of history" (161).  This drive to action is part of the Nazis' manic search for the 
Real, even if they cannot identify it as such.  Even the concept of "action over theory" can 
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be seen as part of this quest, since physical action can be misapprehended as more "Real" 
(or authentic) than intellectual activity.  "They want to be the agents, not the victims, of 
history" (41)--but to what end?  The Nazis seek to leave a mark on history, to prove that 
they have existed, that they have done something real, but that mark will necessarily be a 
caustic burn.   
The main characters of the novel--Tagomi and Juliana especially, but in some 
ways Frank and Childan--seem to represent the other side of that equation, and their 
search for authenticity will send them in a dramatically different (and life-affirming) 
direction.  Their actions will lead to a form of regeneration, of both the individual 
characters and the world (and history) they inhabit.  They are emblematic of the wu side 
of the equation.  The Nazi drive towards death, however, is almost all-encompassing.
The Nazis are so infected by this world view that it can be felt in their physical 
presence--Juliana notes that Joe Cinnadella, the Danish Nazi assassin disguised as an 
Italian truck driver, "breathes--death" (37).  She is aware of this essence of death around 
him, even though she is unaware of his disguise.  Strangely--and in keeping with 
Warrick's notion that the Nazis represent a drive to fascism within all of us--Juliana is 
attracted to Joe all the same.  Such an attraction can be deemed Freudian.
Dick was no stranger to Freud, and to the concepts he popularized, though he 
seems to have taken a greater interest in Jung.  In this vein, Tagomi thinks of the world 
view of the Nazis in psychological terms: "We cannot enter the monstrous schizophrenic 
morass of Nazi internecine intrigue; our minds cannot adapt" (High Castle 191). Baynes 
speaks of the Nazis with Jungian language: "They are overcome by some archetype; their 
egos have expanded psychotically so that they cannot tell where they begin and the 
godhead leaves off.  It is not hubris, not pride; it is inflation of the ego to its ultimate--
confusion between him who worships and that which is worshiped.  Man has not eaten 
God; God has eaten man" (High Castle 42).  Clearly, this description links the Nazis with 
the idea of consumption.  The last line of Baynes' description evokes, to a Dick scholar, 
the author's later work, The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch (1965), in which Martian 
settlers partake in a reverse-Eucharist, and find that it is themselves who have been 
transubstantiated into God--in particular, the Palmer Eldritch of the title.  Palmer Eldritch 
is, in fact, an industrialist, a commercial tycoon.  He comes back to the universe with a 
30
product called Chew-Z, which he uses to enslave the Martian colonists.  He is given God-
like qualities, but these qualities seem connected to his position at the top of the 
consumer-chain.  The colonists of Mars have nothing to do, and spend all of their money 
on frivolous entertainments, such as Chew-Z.  Dick is able to link the literal idea of 
consumption--i.e. the eating of Chew-Z, and the religious reverse-transubstantiation it 
includes--with the more metaphorical and economical idea of consumerism.  
As mentioned, this dynamic is already at work in High Castle, with the Nazis. 
Writing about the novel, Eric S. Rabkin states that Nazis "treated individual humans as 
merely interchangeable elements of a mass-produced set, Jewry, and developed genocide 
as a verity of industrial extermination" (Rabkin 183), and John Rieder, discussing the 
meeting attended by Tagomi in chapter six, regarding the top-ranking members of the 
Nazi party, notes that "the list of the Nazi contestants for power is a veritable catalogue of 
the modes of reifying or rejecting authentic humanity" (Reider 229).  The Nazis are 
further connected to the powers of capitalism and consumerism through repeated 
mentions of IG Farben, the German conglomerate that collaborated with the Nazi party 
and was later dissolved (in our own history) by the Allied powers after WWII, with many 
of its directors indicted at the Nuremburg Trials.  In High Castle, IG Farben still exists, 
and thrives.  The company is identified as a "big German chemical cartel" (20), or as "the 
great cartel in New York" (37).  One of the fascist-leaning truck-drivers states: "You've 
got to hand it to the Germans; monopoly's not a bad idea" (37), while Juliana wishes 
death on them in appropriately consumeristic terms: "They will eat one another at last" 
(247).  This overwhelming drive can be read as the Nazi quest for authenticity.     
This metaphoric link between Nazism and the forces of capitalism necessarily 
puts the motives and drive of capitalism into focus.  If the connection holds true, then it is 
also a criticism regarding consumerism.  Like Nazism, unrestrained capitalism always 
seeks action; it too seeks to be the agent, not the victim, of history, and its quest for profit 
can be seen as equally nihilistic, especially under late capitalism, where corporations can 
be accused of engaging in a scorched-earth policy, wherein they expand the reach of their 
corporate power and increase the output of their consumer items, while at the same time 
exploiting third world labour and causing untold damage to the environment.  This 
connection is, perhaps, illustrated by "Project Farmland": "The Mediterranean Sea bottled 
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up, drained made into tillable farmland, through the use of atomic power--what daring!" 
(25).  Project Farmland shows a marriage between industrial and Nazi ethos, and with the 
same efficiency with which the Nazis carry out their final solution to the "African 
Problem" they manage to rape the Earth for a matter of economy.
In opposition to this ahistorical Nazi drive towards consumption and death are the 
novel's main characters.  Each character in the novel is forced to make a decision, one 
that aligns them against the Nazis and the forces of consumerism.  Frink's choice comes 
early, in his decision to form Edfrank Jewellery with Ed McCarthy.  Childan's has already 
been discussed, and comes when he rebukes Kasoura's suggestion to mass-produce 
Edfrank jewellery, creating wu-less pieces of commercial art, and instead becomes a 
champion of the first new American art since the War.  Tagomi and Juliana, on the other 
hand, have to directly confront the Nazi forces, and both manage to do so, allowing for 
the chance of life in the face of death.
Juliana's confrontation occurs before she encounters Abendsen at the end of the 
novel.  After an extensive shopping spree (during which Juliana is disappointed when she 
has to settle on a synthetic fiber coat [203]), the man she has been travelling with, Joe 
Cinnadella, is revealed to be a fake--a Nazi assassin, intent on killing Abendsen. 
Appropriately, considering that Nazism in High Castle is a psychological, internal force, 
Joe has to take off his more "human" mask to reveal himself as a Nazi.  This revelation 
causes Juliana to experience a sort of mental break, wherein her dialogue and the limited 
third person narration matches her momentary insanity: "She said, speaking slowly and 
painstakingly, 'Hair creates bear who removes spots in nakedness.  Hiding, no hide to be 
hung with a hook.  The hook from God.  Hair, hear, Hur,' Pills eating.  Probably 
turpentine acid.  They all met, decided dangerous most corrosive solvent to eat me 
forever" (High Castle 212).  Juliana's madness comes from a direct confrontation with 
Nazism, and its drive towards death.  The indications she has felt regarding Joe's 
identity--that he "breathes death"--is now revealed to her in all its horror, and Juliana's 
rational mind is unable to cope.  A similar reaction is seen when Tagomi is directly 
confronted by Nazism.  Juliana responds by killing Joe, in an almost inadvertent fashion. 
She is so oblivious to her own actions that she walks out naked into the corridor of the 
hotel.  When she is returned to her room she seems almost surprised to find Joe there, 
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dying (213).  Her actions seem almost influenced from afar, like Abendsen's writing 
Grasshopper via use of the I Ching.
The encounter with Nazism drives Juliana momentarily mad, but by overcoming 
the assassin she is able to save Abendsen.  She gains a new demeanor, and travels on to 
meet Abendsen by herself.  Their meeting has already been discussed; Abendsen admits 
that he wrote Grasshopper by using the I Ching every step of the way.  Furthermore, 
Juliana, seemingly emboldened after defeating the assassin, asks the I Ching why it wrote 
the novel.  The answer is "Inner Truth":
"It means, does it, that my book is true?"
   "Yes," she said.
   With anger he said, "Germany and Japan lost the war."
   "Yes."
   Hawthorne, then, closed the two volumes and rose to his feet; he said 
nothing.
   "Even you don't face it," Juliana said.  (High Castle 257)
Now the ontological dimension of the novel itself is called into question.  What is the 
"authentic" version of history, as far as High Castle is concerned? While this question is 
never answered--can never be answered--Juliana herself seems to gain a certain degree of 
"authenticity" herself.  Abendsen's wife states that Juliana is "terribly disruptive," but her 
husband replies: "So is reality" (258).  Patricia Warrick reminds us that Juliana is a 
"chthonic spirit" and a "direct, literal invention of God's," and asks us to "understand her 
symbolically" (Warrick 80).  This is to say that Juliana seems to share something with the 
I Ching, and the Edfrank Jewellery; like them, she is described as a natural thing, beyond 
her pure physical form, and also like them there seems to be a bit of theophany in her 
character.  That such attributes are ascribed to a female character by an author who 
typically portrays women as castrating shrews is remarkable.  
Juliana's revelation, that the world of High Castle is a fiction, is one of the 
instances in which the epistemological problems of the novel turn into full fledged 
ontological problems, and the narrative becomes fully postmodern.  As John Reider puts 
it: "in High Castle the fabric of reality is metafictional rather than metaphysical" (Reider 
228).  It is a sort of post-structuralist trick, where everything regresses, in a pattern not 
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unlike the supplement, into further levels of fiction, of semiotics.  Though this is the 
ultimate postmodern shift of the novel, a more powerful instance occurs earlier, involving 
Tagomi and a piece of Edfrank Jewellery.
Tagomi's direct confrontation with the Nazis occurs during a meeting between 
Baynes, a German agent in disguise, and Tedeki, an influential Japanese General.  The 
meeting concerns Operation Dandelion, a secret plan within the Nazi government to drop 
the nuclear bomb on Japan's home islands.  The Nazis, having learned of this meeting, 
send a group of armed assassins to Tagomi's office, in an attempt to murder Baynes and 
Tedeki.  Tagomi, a peaceful Taoist, is forced to violently defend the two men, and to do 
so he reaches for a "perfectly preserved U. S. 1860 Civil War Colt .44, a treasured 
collector's item" (High Castle 192).  Tagomi's gun was purchased from American Artistic 
Handicrafts Inc., and since the reader knows that Frink specializes in Civil War-era 
firearms, and that one of Childan's Colts has already been declared a forgery, it is safe to 
assume that this, too, is an inauthentic historic piece.  And yet, while it may not be an 
artefact, it is shown to work correctly--authenticity be damned.  When the Nazi thugs 
burst into Tagomi's office, they are met by gunfire: "The SD man's jaw burst.  Bits of 
bone, flesh, shreds of tooth, flew in the air" (199).  This description is probably the most 
violent in all of Dick's works.  The level of description is used to bring forward the true 
horror of what has just happened, and how serious the act is to Tagomi.  After his 
confrontation with the SD thugs, Tagomi becomes increasingly sick and disoriented, 
much as Juliana became maddened by the revelation that Joe Cinnadella was in fact a 
Nazi assassin.  
This is not the first time Tagomi reacts negatively in the face of Nazism.  At an 
earlier point in the novel, Tagomi is called to a meeting of PSA officials, for the purpose 
of familiarizing them with the possible replacements for Martin Bormann, the recently-
deceased Reichskanzler.  The meeting consists of a presentation on the personality and 
crimes of the Nazi elite.  The proceedings make Tagomi sick.  "I think I am going mad" 
(95) thinks Tagomi, as he listens to a litany of crimes against humanity.  He suffers an 
attack, and is forced to leave the meeting early.  Afterwards, he thinks, "There is evil!  It's 
actual like cement.  I can't believe it.  I can't stand it.  Evil is not a view … All our 
religion is wrong" (96).  Tagomi's engagement with Nazism threatens to kill him, or at 
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least drive him, like Juliana, temporarily mad: "We cannot enter the monstrous 
schizophrenic morass of Nazi internecine intrigue; our minds cannot adapt" (191).  After 
he kills the SD man, his unease is palpable.  Baynes thinks, "A kindly man like Mr. 
Tagomi could be driven insane by the implications of such a reality," a reality in which 
"we are all doomed to commit acts of cruelty or violence or evil" (201) (this sentiment is 
echoed by Mercer in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?).  Tagomi's despair and 
sickness are the consequences of a good man having to confront the nihilistic drive 
towards death embodied in the Nazi character and implicit in all of us.
Following this confrontation, Tagomi finds himself lost, unable to cope.  It is then 
that he visits American Artistic Handicrafts Inc., and meets the now-changed Robert 
Childan.  Childan impresses upon him a piece of authentic, wu-filled Edfrank jewellery, a 
silver squiggle (229).  "Yes, there is something new which animates these" (225) Tagomi 
realizes, and yet he is unable to find its name, to recognize the wu.  But it is there, within 
the jewellery, and not only in his mind, unlike the "historicity" in the Colt .44, an item 
which he is unable to return.
After meditating on the Edfrank jewellery, Tagomi finds himself in a San 
Francisco unlike his own, though similar enough that it is not until he sees the 
Embarcadero Freeway that he realizes the difference.  This San Francisco is clearly not 
one in which the Japanese are dominant; in fact, when he enters a diner and demands a 
seat from one of the white patrons, he is rebuked with "Watch it, Tojo" (232).  The 
existence of the Embarcadero Freeway seems to indicate, by way of meditating on the 
Edfrank jewellery, that even though Tagomi cannot recognize wu, it has worked its magic 
on him, and he has been transported, however briefly, into our San Francisco--there is a 
direct link between the "authentic" jewellery and the authentic world of the reader.  Like 
Juliana, his direct confrontation with Nazism leads to sickness, and the potential cure to 
that sickness takes the form of another quest for authenticity.  Both Juliana and Tagomi 
are shown that their world is not the real world, or at least not the only world.  The 
fictiveness of their own time is shown, and the reader is shown that SF has value for "its 
role in establishing the "historicity" of the present--in the sense of denaturalizing the 
present by showing it to be neither arbitrary nor inevitable but the conjunctural result of 
complex, knowable material processes" (Freedman 55-56).  Tagomi realizes after his 
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revelation: "Now one appreciates Saint Paul's incisive word choice … seen through a 
glass darkly not a metaphor, but astute reference to optical distortion.  We really do see 
astigmatically, in fundamental sense: our space and our time creations of our own psyche, 
and when these momentarily falter--like acute disturbance of middle ear" (233).  The real 
world, the world of wu, of authenticity, is revealed when the psyche falters--the psyche 
which contains its false sense of history, of "historicity."  It is this world that the Nazis 
strive for, in their never-ending cycle of death and violence, and it is this world that the 
other characters seek, through their humanist impulses that set them against the forces of 
consumerism and Nazism.  It is this world that gives shape to the Edfrank jewellery, and 
from this world that the I Ching speaks.  For the purpose of High Castle, this "Real" 
world can be the world of the reader, since the book is obviously a work of fiction and 
can thus see the reader's world as its grounding reality.  But, the problems of history and 
authenticity encountered by the characters of High Castle are every bit as real in our 
"Real" world.  
Tagomi seems irreparably damaged by his encounter with Nazism, but that 
experience, and his experience with the Edfrank jewellery, lead him to have Frank Frink 
released (238).  Frink, whose vengeful employer had reported him as a Jew, was one 
signature away from being deported to Germany.  Instead, Tagomi, who was so affected 
by the jewellery that Frink made, chooses to have him released, and in doing so saves the 
life of a man whom he has never met.  This small act, almost insignificant in the grand 
scheme of things, shows that the life-affirming humanist actions found in the main 
characters of High Castle can still exist in the world of simulacra and simulation, and 
Nazi ascendancy.
In High Castle, then, one can identify the postmodern tropes already identified: 
"a certain flatness, a lack of mimetic or illusory 'depth'; loss or attenuation of discrete 
subjectivity and memory, yielding an odd blend of flattened affect and ... the 
abandonment by the artist of any pretence to a unique style localized in history, in favor 
of pastiche, jargon, and nostalgia; schizophrenic écriture, especially jumbled collage and a 
radical breakdown in reality-testing; the 'hysterical sublime'" (Broderick 10).  These 
tropes are so salient because Dick is not only engaging postmodernism, but speaking 
from within it.  In High Castle, postmodernism is clearly linked to the process of mass-
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production and duplication--the staging ground of consumer society.
Eric S. Rabkin writes of Dick's works: "That which cannot be manufactured--a 
forest, love, an anti-bureaucratic 'irritable action'--becomes ultimately valuable in worlds 
where nearly everything--people, goods, time, even reality--can be replicated or even 
mass-produced" (Rabkin 185).  That which cannot be replicated or mass-produced 
contains within it this kernel of authenticity, this hint of the Real world.  It is true that wu 
is hardly an objective quality; like Benjamin's aura, it seems only identifiable by its 
absence, and is perhaps mystical, almost transcendent.  This is a problem that will plague 
Dick's work; unlike in High Castle, Dick's other characters will continually end up worse 
than they began, unable, as individuals, to beat the system, while at the same time the 
concept of authenticity will become all the more precious, and yet even harder to define. 
As should be obvious from this discussion of High Castle, in a postmodern world, the 
concept of authenticity becomes more and more abstract, more removed from the 
physical realm, until it becomes a sort of theophany, and breaking-through into the real 
world by the divine--and even then, Dick will always distrust it.  Until that point, though, 
it is instructive to look at what Dick holds up as authentic--the humanist drive and, most 
importantly, the blue-collar work of the artisan, the skill and ability to create something 
new with one's own hands.  As Jameson writes: "Handicraft skill … becomes the 
privileged form of productive labour.  Yet it is the related theme of reproduction and the 
production of copies that makes Dick's work one of the most powerful expressions of the 
society of spectacle and pseudo-event" (Archaeologies 347).  After High Castle, Dick's 
work will become more and more occupied with reproduction and the production of 
copies, and the outlook will become increasingly bleaker.  As the forces of consumerism 
and the postmodern world overwhelm the protagonists, the idea of authenticity becomes 
more and more transcendent, and is looked on with even more scepticism than is present 
here.  The next logical step in this investigation, then, is Dick's most famous work, Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
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Chapter Two
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
"Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert." 
- Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto
In The Man in the High Castle, Philip K. Dick struggled with the concept of 
authenticity as something that becomes suspect, or degenerates, in the face of mechanical 
reproduction and the postmodern condition.  In that novel, his suspicion of authenticity 
was primarily directed at history, identity, and consumer items.  After problematizing the 
idea of authenticity in relation to these things, Dick was forced to make the authentic 
increasingly transcendental, in the form of the wu-infused Edfrank jewellery, the 
omniscient I Ching, and the self-reflexive novel-within-the-novel The Grasshopper Lies 
Heavy.  In the next novel of this study, Dick continues his struggle with the concept of 
authenticity, this time focusing on the idea of humanity itself.  By upping the ante in this 
way, Dick makes the truly authentic even harder to pin down in the material world, and 
accordingly is forced to make it even more transcendent.  
Dick is perhaps most well known as the novelist behind Ridley Scott's Blade 
Runner, a film based on Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?  Initially a commercial 
failure, Blade Runner has gone on to reach cult status, and has been re-released on more 
than one occasion, most recently at the end of 2007 in an "Ultimate Collector's Edition." 
While the popularity of this Dick-inspired work may lead some viewers to hunt down the 
source material, the unfortunate fact is that Blade Runner is only loosely based on the 
novel, deemphasizing most of the philosophical and moral dilemmas that Dick dwells on, 
and phasing out entirely the concept of fake animals and the televisual religion, 
Mercerism.  Since the primary conceit--the novum--of Androids is the existence of 
manufactured, inauthentic humans, it is worth quoting Darko Suvin's brief description of 
the role of the android in Dick's opus:
[T]he totally unethical and therefore inhuman person is often an android, 
what Dick, with a stress on its counterfeiting and artificial aspect, calls a 
simulacrum … An interesting central anthropological tenet is adumbrated 
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here, halfway between Rousseau and Marx, according to which there is an 
authentic core identical with humanity in Homo Sapiens, from which men 
and women have to be alienated by civilizational pressures in order to 
behave in an unauthentic, dehumanized way, so that there is always an 
inner resistance to such pressures in anybody who simply follows his or 
her human(e) instinct of treating people as ends, not means. (Suvin, The 
Opus, 12)
While the androids in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? should not be dismissed as 
"totally unethical," Suvin's comments do point toward their double function: first, to 
create an adventure-type storyline upon which to construct the novel, but also, more 
importantly, to act in a symbolic way, both to call into question the concept of "authentic 
humanity" by positing its opposite, and to show the sort of humanity that is suited to an 
inauthentic, unnatural world.
In High Castle, the reader takes for granted the dichotomy between the "Real," 
authentic history of the reader's world, and the "fake" or fictional history of the novel.  As 
the novel progresses, that dichotomy is tested, and eventually breaks down; in other 
words, it is deconstructed.  This same process occurs in Androids.  In this novel, a 
dichotomy exists between "Real," authentic human beings and "fake" andys--biological 
androids that are virtually indistinguishable from their authentic counterparts.  Shetley 
and Fergusson, speaking of the film version, Blade Runner, write: "Just as the mechanical 
reproduction of artwork destroys the sense of authenticity and uniqueness upon which 
aura depends, the mechanical reproduction of replicants [androids] threatens the sense of 
individuality that undergirds our notion of the human" (Shetley and Fergusson 69).  This 
dichotomy between man and android exists, initially, in the mind of the reader, who, 
confronted with the prospect of artificial humanity, cannot help but compare it to 
"authentic" humanity.  As N. K. Hayles writes, "Dick linked the 'authentic human' with 
the 'real,' a construction that also implies its inverse" (423).  Just as in High Castle, this 
duality is deconstructed as the narrative plays out.  Though this duality is problematized 
almost from the first for the reader, the process takes much longer for Rick Deckard, the 
novel's protagonist, who has a harder time giving up the distinctions that define not only 
his job but the ontology of the world he lives in.    
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Androids "presents a USA disintegrated psychologically more than materially by 
the Third World War" (Pagetti 23), and is set on a future Earth, where the sun no longer 
shines, and "everything has the aspect of reality but is really 'a simulation'; everything is 
covered by or immersed within the signs of cultural entropy--'kipple'-- which leads 
humans towards the same 'flattening of affect' that identifies androids" (Easterbrook 27). 
The forces of entropy dominate, resulting in an abundance of kipple, which is described 
by the chickenhead character John Isidore as "useless objects, like junk mail or match 
folders after you use the last match or gum wrappers or yesterday's homeopape.  When 
nobody's around, kipple reproduces itself.  For instance, if you go to bed leaving any 
kipple around your apartment, when you wake up the next morning there's twice as much 
of it.  It always gets more and more" (Androids 57).  Christopher Palmer notes that 
entropy "is seen as a kind of ground of existence, something into which life constantly 
collapses back when exhausted, but also as a force always ready to infiltrate and take 
over," and that, "[f]rom a historical point of view, entropy may be interpreted as the 
returning repressed of modernity's investment in constant change, change which devours 
itself and leaves modernity without a point of reference" (Palmer 60-61).  The radiation 
caused by the past nuclear war has mutated humanity, resulting in "specials" like Isidore--
men of (supposedly) reduced mental or physical capacity.  Even a "regular" like Deckard 
will not go outside without an Ajax model Mountibank Lead Codpiece, for fear that he 
will discover, at his next monthly medical checkup, that he can no longer "reproduce 
within the tolerances set by the law" (5-6). All told, mankind is left fighting against the 
forces of entropy which, in Dick's world, are in no way immaterial or abstract.  All things 
are reduced to kipple, which multiplies, just as Mercer always descends into the tomb 
world.  Because men are sterile and many emigrate from Earth, humanity is failing to 
regenerate itself. As a result, the world is falling into decrepitude.  However, the 
inauthentic humans, the androids, do not suffer the same fate, and so threaten to supplant 
humanity (Palmer 62).
Rick Deckard is a bounty hunter.  His job: to seek out and exterminate androids 
(andys) who have infiltrated the human population, from which they are virtually 
indistinguishable.  The one characteristic that separates men from their mechanical 
doppelgangers is humanity's capacity for empathy, which only the Voigt-Kampff test, 
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administered by bounty hunters, can certify.  However, it is not only humanity itself that 
is subject to replication and electronic simulation.  Many of the world's animals have 
become extinct, and those that remain are a rare commodity.  Owning an animal is an 
important status symbol; not only does it show off the owner's wealth, since animals are 
so expensive, but it also proves how empathetic the owner is.  This second distinction is 
just as important as the first, since empathy is what separates man from android. 
Deckard's neighbour tells him: "You know how people are about not taking care of an 
animal; they consider it immoral and anti-empathetic" (10).  One affirms one's humanity 
by owning an animal, and so man is defined by his commodities.  So important are 
animals, as a symbol of both wealth and empathy, that virtually every character carries 
around Sidney's Animal & Fowl Catalogue, so as to correctly appraise the worth of real 
animals (and, presumably, their own humanity).
Animals are thus of such importance that many people, Deckard included, care for 
electronic animals in the absence of an original.  Deckard owns the electronic sheep of 
the title.  He admits: "Owning and maintaining a fraud had a way of gradually 
demoralizing one.  And yet from a social standpoint it had to be done, given the absence 
of the real article" (7).  Remarkably, the electronic animals require the same amount of 
care.  Deckard tells his neighbour: "It's a premium job.  And I've put as much time and 
attention into caring for it as I did when it was real … You feel the same doing it; you 
have to keep your eye on it exactly as you did when it was really alive" (9-10).  It is even 
noted that the repair trucks for mechanical animals are made to look like they belong to a 
veterinary hospital (10).  The fraud is so thoroughgoing that the fake animals are, on the 
surface, real, and a great deal of time and resources are spent maintaining the illusion. 
Deckard, who seems especially obsessed about animals, is even fooled twice by 
electronic animals: first, at the Rosen Foundation, where he mistakes an ersatz owl for the 
real deal, and then at the end of the novel, when he believes he has discovered an 
authentic toad.  That he is so easily deceived despite the fact that both species of animal 
are known to be extinct is distressing, to say the least, when his business is telling the real 
from the fake, and a mistake of such magnitude in his line of work could lead him to 
retire a human being.
It is not only animals and humans that are fakes.  Isidore's narrative notes, in 
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passing, that even milk and eggs have been replaced by their "ersatz substitutes" (22); 
later, it is noted that a desk is made of "imitation oak" (76).  Even more sinister is the 
existence of the Penfield Mood Organ, introduced in the first sentence of the novel.  The 
Penfield Mood Organ is a device that regulates and controls the emotions of its users. 
Deckard uses his not only to wake himself up, but to invokes a "creative and fresh 
attitude towards his job," which the Penfield accomplishes through "artificial brain 
stimulation" (5, emphasis added).  In a rather comic introduction to the novel, Deckard 
argues with his wife, Iran, because she has scheduled for herself a "six-hour self-
accusatory depression" (2).  She has decided on this course of action--unthinkable to 
Deckard--after listening  to the sound of all the empty apartments surrounding them: "I 
realized how unhealthy it was, sensing the absence of life, not just in this building but 
everywhere, and not reacting--do you see?  I guess you don't.  But that used to be 
considered a sign of mental illness; they called it 'absence of appropriate affect'" (3).  It 
is, of course, ironic that Iran chooses to remedy her estrangement from real humanity by 
engaging in an artificially-induced emotion; but such is the postmodern condition. 
Furthermore, her statement is revealing, since the 'absence of appropriate affect' which 
she feels--and which she indicates Deckard feels but is entirely unaware of--will later be 
identified as a defining characteristic of androids.  The Penfield Mood Organ is one of 
Dick's more clever inventions; seemingly satirizing the culture of self-medication 
(Benzedrine, Valium), it also acts as a criticism of the dehumanizing aspects of 
postmodernity:
[D]ick's criticism of the loss of human desire, or freedom, is particularly 
expressed within the narrative through the use of the Penfield Mood 
Organ. The name of the device is suggestive for two reasons. First of all, 
the brand name is synonymous with its mention, which alludes to the 
capitalistic nature of this sensation-synthesizing device. Secondly, the term 
"mood organ" insists that the technological tool is a prosthetic that 
displaces the organic organ that might control these kinds of responses 
naturally. (Attaway 12)
The name of the mood organ should be read as a reference to Wilder Penfield, the 
Canadian neurosurgeon whose investigations into the causes of epilepsy led him to 
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experiment with neural stimulation.  Penfield also "frequently acknowledged the 
similarities between brains and media technology," (Enns 71) which certainly would have 
appealed to Dick.  In keeping with Dick's major concerns, in Androids, "Penfield" is used 
like a brand name--it could just as well be the Pfizer Mood Organ.  
Perhaps it is because Iran seems more aware of the lack of humanity in her world 
that she slips deeper and deeper into her dependence on the Penfield Mood Organ. 
Unlike Deckard, Iran is also a chronic user of the empathy box.  She is as alienated from 
humanity as any other character in the novel; perhaps more so, considering that she never 
once leaves the apartment complex.  N. K. Hayles, in speaking of the sort of 
inauthenticity rife in Androids, writes, "The ontology of the human and the ontology of 
the world mutually construct each other.  When one is fake, the other is contaminated by 
fakery as well; when one is authentic, the authenticity of the other is, if not guaranteed, at 
least held out as a strong possibility" (Hayles 423).  It is no coincidence that a world 
cluttered with fake food, imitation resources, and electronic emotions, is peopled with 
simulated humanity, both in the form of androids and "authentic" humans, like Iran, who 
seem to have forfeited those emotions which make us truly human: "Most androids I've 
known have more vitality and desire to live than my wife.  She has nothing to give me" 
(Androids 83).  
In Androids, there is a suspicion that nothing is "real," that everything is a copy, a 
replication, and that the original may no longer exist; it is like Baudrillard's concept of 
the simulacrum, and so it is no surprise that Baudrillard, speaking of Dick's work, has 
written: 
Dick does not create an alternate cosmos nor a folklore or a cosmic 
exoticism, nor intergalactic heroic deeds; the reader is, from the outset, in 
a total simulation without origin, past, or future—in a kind of flux of all 
coordinates (mental, spatio-temporal, semiotic). It is not a question of 
parallel universes, or double universes, or even of possible universes: not 
possible nor impossible, nor real nor unreal. It is hyperreal. It is a universe 
of simulation, which is something altogether different. And this is so not 
because Dick speaks specifically of simulacra. SF has always done so, but 
it has always played upon the double, on artificial replication or imaginary 
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duplication, whereas here the double has disappeared. There is no more 
double; one is always already in the other world, an other world which is 
not another, without mirrors or projection or utopias as means for 
reflection. The simulation is impassable, unsurpassable, checkmated, 
without exteriority. We can no longer move "through the mirror" to the 
other side, as we could during the golden age of transcendence. 
(Baudrillard 16)
The world of Androids is fake all over, and so the quest for authenticity is all the more 
important.  Deckard's mission to track down and retire the six andys, for all its potential 
as an action-driven narrative (a potential that Blade Runner picked up), quickly turns into 
an existential, even ontological quest, where Deckard is forced to face the idea that 
authenticity may only be a transcendent or religious idea, and in no way a physical one.
First developed as "Synthetic Freedom Fighters," andys were later modified to 
become the "mobile donkey engine of the colonization program" (Androids 13).  As it is 
explained in an early chapter of the novel, anyone who could afford to emigrate was 
given an andy as a servant: "[t]hat had been the ultimate incentive of emigration: the 
android servant as carrot, the radioactive fallout as stick" (13).  Andys are not robots; they 
are made of living tissue, physically indistinguishable from humans.  The only way to 
distinguish the andy is through applying the Voigt-Kampff test, which tests for empathy 
in the subject.  It is understood that andys do not feel empathy, that empathy is a 
distinctly human characteristic, a sort of secularized version of the soul:
Empathy, evidently, existed only within the human community, whereas 
intelligence to some degree could be found throughout every phylum and 
order including the arachnida.  For one thing, the emphatic faculty 
probably required an unimpaired group instinct; a solitary organism, such 
as a spider, would have no use for it; in fact it would tend to abort a 
spider's ability to survive.  It would make him conscious of the desire to 
live on the part of his prey.  (Androids 26)
The lack of empathy in androids is compared to the "flattening of affect" found in some 
human schizophrenics (33).  It is worth noting the similarity in this term to Jameson's 
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"waning of affect," which he considers typical of postmodern literature.3
The specific andys that Deckard has to face have come to Earth from Mars, and 
they had to kill to do so.  After lengthy descriptions of Earth's radiation and the "kipple 
effect," the reader is left wondering why andys would choose to come to Earth at all. 
According to one of the androids, Pris: "'We came back … because nobody should have 
to live there.  It wasn't conceived for habitation, at least not within the last billion years" 
(132).  She also notes that andys, as well as humans, are lonely on Mars (131).  Pris's 
comments should be taken with a grain of salt, since she is attempting to hide her true 
nature, and lies continuously to Isidore, but this is the closest the novel comes to offering 
some reasoning.  
The nature of the main problem--that andys are indistinguishable from humans--
needs to be addressed.  Why are there androids that are so similar to humans that they can 
be confused?  Why does this problem exist?  The obvious reason is that Dick needs it to 
be so, for his narrative to even take place--for him to ask the questions he asks.  Still, it is 
telling that when he does directly address this issue, he lays the blame on the nature of 
capitalism itself:
"This problem," Rick said, "stems entirely from your method of operation, 
Mr. Rosen.  Nobody forced your organization to evolve the production of 
humanoid robots to a point where--"
   "We produced what the colonists wanted," Eldon Rosen said.  "We 
followed the time-honored principle underlying every commercial venture. 
If our firm hadn't made these progressively more human types, other firms 
in the field would have." (Androids 47)
 On Earth, the androids are ruthlessly tracked by bounty hunters like Deckard. 
3   Here it is also worth noting the similarity between another of Jameson's postmodern terms, 
"schizophrenic ecriture," and Dick's own description of autism in Martian Time Slip.  Jameson refers to 
schizophrenia as "a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers … personal identity is itself the effect of a 
certain temporal unification of past and future with one's present … the schizophrenic is reduced to an 
experience of pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time" 
(Jameson 26-27). Now, Dick's theory of autism, via Dr. Glaub: "It assumes a derangement in the sense of 
time in the autistic individual, so that the environment around him is so accelerated that he cannot cope 
with it, in fact, he is unable to perceive it properly … Just extremely high-pitched mishmash … This 
concept of time-rates may open a doorway to minds so fatigued by the impossible task of communicating in 
a world where everything happens with such rapidity…" (Time-Slip 44-45).  There is ample reason to 
believe that Jameson's theories of postmodernism are at least partly derived from a reading of Dick, but at 
the very least they seem to be working from the same viewpoint.
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They cannot fuse with Mercer, which is a supposed proof of their inhumanity; as such, 
they hate the empathy religion.  But, rather than using the androids as malevolent, alien 
invaders, Dick seems to suggest that Earth is a more suitable home for them than it is for 
humanity.  Deckard seems to intuit this, when he comes to the realization that it is he, and 
not the androids, that is allied with the forces of entropy: "I'm part of the form-destroying 
process of entropy.  The Rosen Association creates, and I unmake" (86).  It seems only 
suitable that a world consisting only of copies should be populated with copied humans. 
"What counts as real?  What counts as human?" asks Hayles.  "Haunting Dick's fiction, 
these questions point toward his conviction that the android, that 'ersatz human,' is not 
simply an object within the fictional world he constructs but somehow is deeply bound up 
with reality construction itself" (Hayles 422).  This is to say that the android is as much of 
this world as it is of Dick's fictional one.  In the hyperreal, where Dick's fiction and our 
reality merge, the problems posed by the android are real: "Exposing the fractures in 
possessive individualism, the figure of the android allows Dick to combine a scathing 
critique of the liberal subject with the psychological complexities of trying to decide who 
qualifies as an 'authentic' human" (Hayles 423).  Further: "Replication as a poetically 
metaphysical representation of the rationalizing post-industrial world signals, in Dick's 
work, the seductive devaluation of the human" (Rabkin 187).  Dick's androids work to 
problematize an easy definition of humanity, one that has been called into question by the 
hyperreality of the postmodern world.  
While the real world may not have to deal with androids that are indistinguishable 
from humans, it does have to deal with the concept of humanity in a world of increasing 
mechanical- and computerized-reproduction, untamed consumerism, and all the rest. 
While Dick was in no position to speak about human cloning, the philosophical problems 
of his andys are directly relatable.  Human cloning may or may not be achieved in our 
lifetime, but the possibility is certainly very real.  From most classical standpoints, this 
raises a serious question about the nature of humanity.  If it can be mechanically 
reproduced, then of what value is it?  If it cannot be reproduced, then in what way is 
humanity made up of more than its genes and tissues?  A religious response would be to 
point to the soul, but a more secular viewpoint might have to find something else within 
the makeup of humanity to hold up as "authentic," and Dick has already made an attempt 
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at this, by identifying empathy as humanity's saving grace.
As already stated, the only method in Androids used to accurately identify andys 
is the Voigt-Kampff test, which judges the empathy of its subject by measuring the 
response-time of questions and unconscious movements-- "the so-called 'shame' or 
'blushing' reaction to a morally shocking stimulus" (41).  Andys, we are told, do not have 
empathy, even for each other: "'An android,' he said, 'doesn't care what happens to 
another android.  That's one of the indications we look for'" (Androids 89).  
By identifying empathy as the one human trait that cannot be reproduced, Dick 
points to empathy as our most human, our most authentic, of characteristics.  A reader 
may choose to accept this distinction, but it is problematized from the first page, even 
before the novel establishes empathy as the true mark of humanity, and is further 
exacerbated by the Voigt-Kampff test, the tool used by bounty hunters to discern andys 
from humans.
The Voigt-Kampff test, which tests for empathy, is the bounty hunter's first (and 
seemingly only) tool for discovering andys within the general populace.  It works by 
having the subject respond to a number of questions, each one worded so as to induce an 
empathetic response.  The most extended description of the Voigt-Kampff test comes in 
chapter five (44-53).  In it, Deckard performs the Voigt-Kampff test on Rachel Rosen, 
who, he has been told, is the daughter of Eldon Rosen, the owner of the Rosen 
Association.  Rachel is actually an andy, an advanced Nexus-6 android, and the test is 
actually a set up to corner Deckard and end his investigation.
The reader may be surprised to discover that virtually all of the questions posed in 
the Voigt-Kampff test revolve around animals.  Deckard confronts Rachel with vignettes 
centering on violence towards animals, such as a killing jar used by a butterfly collector, 
a bearskin rug, or a bullfight.  These images of violence are intended to elicit a negative 
empathetic response.  Attaway notes that "[t]o the contemporary reader, however, many 
of the scenarios that are supposed to inspire horror from the average "human" are 
everyday occurrences, such as calfskin wallets, boiling lobsters and fur coats" (Attaway 
10).  A reader would probably assume that Dick, in an act of sf world-building, has 
decided that in a world where authentic animals have become almost extinct, the 
empathetic bond between man and animal would be greatly advanced.  The properly 
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authentic human reaction to Deckard's examples--for instance, the bullfight--is not 
disgust, but a genuine sense of dismay, a moral and empathetic reaction.  
The test proves here--and later, with Luba Luft (88-92)--to be fairly easy to 
confuse or evade.  It is only due to Deckard's own intuition that Rachel is caught; the test 
itself--developed by the Pavlov institute (25)--fails to identify Rachel as an android. 
Pavlov, of course, is most well known for his research into conditioning.  Attaway says of 
the test's origins: 
Dick's subtle reference to Pavlov suggests that the "empathetic response" 
according to which human beings are defined in this dystopic society is 
actually the capacity to be physiologically programmed. The ability to 
produce a conditioned response indicates the test subject's humanity. 
Unlike androids, human beings can be trained. (Attaway 9)
Jill Galvan also notes that "what passes for 'empathy' among humans derives far more 
from a cultural construction than from any categorical essence," and that the Voigt-
Kampff test emphasizes the "contrived nature" of this human quality (Galvan 415).  The 
test itself, designed to identify andys, paradoxically calls into question the existence of 
empathy in humans.  Humanity's capacity for empathy is further challenged by the 
televisual religion, Mercerism, and the "empathy box" which is its physical 
manifestation.
Isidore, the novel's most enthusiastic Mercerite, explains the importance of the 
empathy box: " 'But an empathy box,' he said, stammering in his excitement, 'is the most 
personal possession you have!  It's an extension of your body; it's the way you touch 
other humans, it's the way you stop being alone'" (58).  Users of the empathy box--
followers of Mercerism--take a hold of the device's handles, and "fuse" with Wilbur 
Mercer, a "tottering, ascending old man" (27) on an eternal, Sisyphian climb up a 
forbidding hill.  During his climb Mercer is attacked by unknown assailants, who cast 
rocks at him.  Mercerites all fuse together into the being of Mercer, thus sharing his trial. 
When he is struck by rocks, they themselves feel it, and can be physically injured. 
Sharing this experience with others is treated as the ultimate in empathy.  Isidore 
explains: "Wilbur Mercer is always renewed.  He's eternal.  At the top of the hill he's 
struck down; he sinks into the tomb world but then he rises inevitably.  And us with him. 
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So we're eternal, too" (67).  Carlo Pagetti compares Mercer's journey to Christ climbing 
Golgotha (23), while Jennifer Attaway compares the empathy box to the modern-day PC, 
in that it is "a site of communion, a way in which human beings merge into a virtual 
embrace" (Attaway 11).  Of course, Dick was not foreseeing the internet with his 
invention, but the similarities are clearly there--especially worth noting is the fact that 
while the empathy box, like the PC, allows many people from all over the world to 
interact, it also removes interaction from the physical realm; it mediates human 
interaction through an electronic device, leaving its users, no matter how connected, 
ultimately alone.  Dick's immediate inspiration for the empathy box was probably the 
television; Anthony Enns calls it a "television religion" (Enns 81), and Jameson refers to 
Mercerism as a "televisual spectacle," while noting that, for Dick, the comparison to 
television is probably a bad thing (Archaeologies 371).  Either way--PC or TV--the point 
is that the empathy box is a technological, electronic tool, and that it paradoxically 
creates distance and alienation between its users while offering up total communion. 
This is in keeping with Scott Bukatman's view that technology "drastically compromises 
an insulated human community in two ways: it separates the individual from human 
contact; but more significantly, it makes her dependent upon--addicted to--the life of the 
machine" (Bukatman 418).  Iran and Isidore are isolated from the rest of humanity, and 
are therefore addicted to the one thing that seems to make them a part of it: the empathy 
box.  But the empathy box can offer only the illusion of togetherness.  
Jameson puts it this way: "The crucial point about 'empathy', however, is that in 
Mercerism it is enacted in the form of 'fusion' with the other, or, rather, with the televisual 
image of the other.  Philosophically, in other words, it has seemed impossible to imagine 
any identification with the other short of a merging together of the two subjectivities" 
(Archaeologies 367).  As previously noted, when the concept of authenticity becomes 
more and more problematized, what is actually held up as authentic becomes more and 
more drastic; similarly, when the technologically advanced society of replication and 
mass-reproduction makes authentic human interaction more and more problematic, when 
mankind becomes totally alienated, then the idea of identification with the other is pushed 
to such extremities that only total merger of personalities seems acceptable--the type of 
"fusion" offered by Mercerism.  But the fact remains that the followers of Mercerism are 
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physically alone when clutching the handles of their empathy boxes.  The total merger of 
personalities does nothing to unite the people—they remain as solitary as ever.  As 
Bukatman puts it: "A citizenry alienated by the industrialist-capitalist mode of production 
is granted an illusion of belonging and participation; the fragmentation of the productive 
and social realms is replaced by the appearance of coherence and wholeness" (Bukatman 
37).
What should not be ignored, though, is that Mercerism is not just a tool for human 
interaction, but the only remaining religion on Dick's future Earth.  It is entirely fitting 
that the religion of Androids is a technological one, given that humanity is becoming 
increasingly inauthentic.  People worship the image; gripping the handles of the empathy 
box is like genuflecting before the crucifix.  Mercerism preaches the tenets of an empathy 
religion which give mankind an ethical standpoint from which they can interact with their 
world.  Early in the novel, Deckard claims that his neighbour should sell him one of his 
colts, arguing that for him "to have two horses and me none, that violates the whole basic 
theological and moral structure of Mercerism" (8).  In this way Mercerism does  
emphasize a certain degree of moral human interaction.  It also allows Deckard a moral 
justification for his line of work:
In Mercerism, an absolute evil plucked at the threadbare cloak of the 
tottering, ascending old man, but it was never clear who or what this evil 
presence was.  A Mercerite sensed evil without understanding it.  Put 
another way, a Mercerite was free to locate the nebulous presence of The 
Killers wherever he saw fit.  For Rick Deckard an escaped humanoid 
robot, which had killed its master, which had been equipped with an 
intelligence greater than that of many human beings, which had no regard 
for animals, which possessed no ability to feel emphatic joy for another 
life form's success or grief at its defeat--that, for him, epitomized The 
Killers.  (27)
When taken into consideration along with the general good character of John Isidore, this 
comment indicates that, for Dick, intelligence itself is not a positive thing.  This is 
perhaps because intelligence is something that can be replicated, or technologically 
created, as in the computer chip (or, in Dick's fictitious world, the andy).  A Mercerite 
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does not comprehend evil, he senses it.  Isidore lives up to this ideal when he interacts 
with Pris: "Now that her initial fear had diminished, something else had begun to emerge 
from her.  Something more strange.  And, he thought, deplorable.  A coldness.  Like, he 
thought, a breath from the vacuum between inhabited worlds, in fact from nowhere: it 
was not what she did or said but what she did not do and say" (Androids 59).  Later, when 
interacting with the group of andys: "they're all strange.  He sensed it without being able 
to finger it.  As if a peculiar and malign abstractness pervaded their mental processes" 
(137).  In this way Isidore can sense The Killers without understanding them.  Note, too, 
the similarity between how Isidore views the andys and how the characters of High 
Castle view the Nazis.  As is shown in the sections of High Castle involving Juliana 
Frink and Joe Cinadella, the inhumanness of the Nazis can be sensed, and Dick seems to 
attribute part of their wrongness with abstraction.  Still, this aspect of the andys is only 
sensed.  Cognition, rather than supporting the initial sense of danger, seems to 
problematize it, and as Deckard's narrative plays out he cannot help but begin to cogitate 
on the real differences between humans and andys, and the nature of his work.
As has been shown with the example of Deckard's wife, Iran, human characters in 
the novel work to undermine the concept of a transcendent or pure human quality.  One 
of the most problematic characters, for Deckard, is Phil Resch, a bounty hunter whom he 
briefly comes to believe is an android.  He is convinced of Resch's inhumanity by the 
cool calculation of his demeanour--in a sense, he shows the lack of appropriate affect.  It 
is Resch himself who begins to conclude that he might be an android (111), and Deckard 
is so appalled by the fact that Resch enjoys killing that he doubts the other bounty 
hunter's humanity (120).  When Resch is proven to be human, Deckard is left in a state of 
shock.  The confusion, he decides, stemmed from Resch's lack of empathy towards 
androids.  For Resch, this does not seem like a problem, but Deckard realizes that he now 
empathizes with the artificial constructs (123).  He even asks Resch if he thinks androids 
have souls (118), and soon realizes that the problem is not with Resch, but with himself: 
"I'm capable of feeling empathy for at least specific, certain androids … There's nothing 
unnatural or unhuman about Phil Resch's reactions; it's me" (124).  His encounter with 
Phil Resch, with whom he retires the andy Luba Luft, leads him to the following 
introspection: "So much for the distinction between authentic living humans and 
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humanoid constructs.  In that elevator at the museum, he said to himself, I rode down 
with two creatures, one human, the other android … and my feelings were reverse of 
those intended.  Of those I'm accustomed to feel--am required to feel" (125).  Deckard is 
required to feel the right way due to his job--but the wording also points out that his ideas 
about humanity and androids, and the concept of empathy upon which those ideas are 
based, could in fact be nothing more than conditioned reactions.
Prior to being cleared by the Voigt-Kampff test, Resch, in an attempt to prove his 
own humanity, notes that he owns and cares for a squirrel.  He asks Deckard if he's ever 
heard of an andy that cares for a pet.  Deckard responds: "In two cases that I know of, 
andys owned and cared for animals.  But it's rare.  From what I've been able to learn, it 
generally fails; the andy is unable to keep the animal alive.  Animals require an 
environment of warmth to flourish.  Except for reptiles and insects" (114).  This 
statement is enlightening, not as a comment on Resch's humanity, but on Deckard's, for it 
is Deckard who has had to replace his organic sheep with an ersatz one, after the original 
died due to his own malfeasance.  
The idea that the ownership of animals is largely to validate the humanity of the 
owner is reinforced by further evidence in the novel.  Deckard identifies Rachel as an 
andy because she refers to an animal (in this case, an owl) as "it" rather than "her" (51). 
More importantly, as Deckard interacts with andys more and more, he begins to question 
his own humanity, realizing, implicitly, that andys may be just as "human" as he himself 
is.  The growth of this existential dilemma is matched by his obsessive desire to own a 
real animal.  Deckard eventually decides to buy a goat, despite the fact that it will cost all 
of the money he will make for retiring all six andys: "The expense, the contractual 
indebtedness, appalled him; he found himself shaking.  But I had to do it, he said to 
himself.  The experience with Phil Resch--I have to get my confidence, my faith in 
myself and my abilities, back.  Or I won't keep my job" (148).  What Deckard needs to 
do, in affect, is reaffirm his humanity after he encounters various situations that call the 
distinction between andys and humans into question, and the only way he knows how to 
do that is to buy a real, authentic animal, to function as an external symbol of both his 
success and his reified empathy.  This is one of the more poignant, though subtle, 
suggestions that Deckard may in fact be an android, and this is born out even by the 
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wording used to describe his mental process: "Possibly his encounter with the bounty 
hunter Phil Resch had altered some minute synapsis in him, had closed one neurological 
switch and opened another.  And this perhaps had started a chain reaction" (152, 
emphasis added).  That Deckard anxiously tries to reaffirm his humanity by buying a 
consumer item, and spending all of his money, is worth noting.  Also, as has already been 
noted, the Voigt-Kampff test, which supposedly can tell man from machine, revolves 
around questions regarding animals.  This seems to support the idea that animals, in 
Dick's world, have come to be a sort of transcendental symbol of human empathy.
That a fully-fleshed character like Deckard could be an android--and the text 
never seriously dwells on this possibility for long--is held up by the fact that the androids 
in the novel often act in an empathetic and "human" way, despite the supposed hard-and-
fast rule of the Voigt-Kampff test, and, conversely, that none of the human characters 
(except the "chicken head" Isidore)  seem particularly empathetic.  Indeed, Deckard 
displays his lack of empathy early in the novel, when, after hearing about Holden's near-
death experience, he looks into the logistics of purchasing an ostrich: "Dave Holden, he 
reflected, is out of action.  That could mean a great deal [of cash] … depending on how 
many assignments show up during the coming month" (28).      
Many of the andys Deckard encounters in the novel--most notably Rachel Rosen, 
Pris Stratton, and Roy and Irmgard Baty--possess qualities which, if not truly empathetic, 
are at the very least deeply emotional and seemingly human, while no truly empathetic 
relationships exist between humans.  Pris Stratton--assumed by Isidore to be a human--
refers to Roy and Irgmard Baty as her "best friends" (130).  While this may seem a ruse 
to aid her in her masquerade, the text seems to treat them as friends, despite the fact that 
the reader has been told again and again that andys do not work well in groups.  The three 
fugitive andys come together in Pris's apartment, where they hope to make a last stand 
against Deckard.  Certainly there are reasons to suspect that their empathetic response is 
not as finely attuned as it should be in a human; for instance, there is the portion of the 
novel where they torment and torture a spider, seemingly proving that andys are 
incapable of true empathy.  Were this the only action available to the reader by which to 
judge the andys, then certainly they would be found wanting; however, there is ample 
reason to suggest that they are capable of a certain degree of empathy.  Most obvious is 
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the relationship between Roy and Irmgard Baty, who act as though they are married. 
After Deckard retires Irmgard, Roy Baty cries out in sorrow:
"I'm sorry, Mrs. Baty," Rick said, and shot her.
   Roy Baty, in the other room, let out a cry of anguish.
   "Okay, you loved her," Rick said.  "And I loved Rachel.  And the special 
loved the other Rachel." (197)
Deckard is able to accept that Roy, an andy, is capable of love, even though love, 
presumably,  requires empathy.  Furthermore, Rick acknowledges the relationship 
between the two by referring to Irmgard as "Mrs. Baty," a categorization that would be 
off-limits to andys.  This is no doubt due to the action of the novel, which has 
deconstructed the binary of human and android to the extent that Deckard himself no 
longer believes in the firm distinction.  It is also due to an earlier conversation with 
Rachel Rosen.  
Contrary to the laws of Earth, Deckard sleeps with Rachel, feeling himself driven 
to do so as he begins to question his own authenticity.  After doing so, Rachel informs 
him that this was part of a plot on her part.  She believes that Deckard, having slept with 
her, will now be unable to retire Pris Stratton, since Pris is the same model as Rachel. 
Since Deckard, being a human, is fully empathetic, then it stands to reason that, having 
attached himself so intimately with Rachel, he will hesitate when he needs to kill Pris. 
The remarkable thing about Rachel's plan is that it is not motivated by self-preservation; 
rather, Rachel is actually able to look out for the other, for Pris Stratton:
"You know what I have?  Toward this Pris android?"
   "Empathy," he said.
   "Something like that.  Identification; there goes I." (165)
This is in stark contrast to the message that Deckard received from Mercer, only a few 
short pages before--that the basic condition of life is "to be required to violate your own 
identity" (156).  This is not to say that Rachel is merely proving her inhumanity by 
conforming to her identity, rather than violating it--rather, it is more likely a simple 
example of the android forming the sort of emotional bond that is supposed to be the 
privilege of humanity, while the human must face the reality that again and again he must 
violate the emotions and morals that are supposed to define him as a person.  
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Perhaps Rachel's most human moment is when she enacts her vengeance against 
the bounty hunter.  After Deckard has killed her "sister" Pris, as well as Irmgard and Roy 
Baty, Rachel goes to Deckard's apartment and pushes his new organic goat off of the roof, 
killing it.  Iran comments that the killing was "needless."  Deckard responds, "'Not 
needless,' he said.  'She had what seemed to her a reason.'  An android reason, he thought" 
(201).  Deckard is still confused, though; far from having an "android" reason to kill his 
goat, Rachel is clearly acting out of spite, brought on by Deckard's killing of her friends, 
and also, it seems, lashing out as a jilted lover.  The reason for Rachel's action is 
extremely understandable from a human standpoint.  By this point in the novel, however, 
Deckard seems incapable of separating the human from the android, and so cannot 
understand her behaviour on a basic emotional level.  In the last chapters of the novel, it 
is Wilbur Mercer who acts to guide Deckard through his ontological doubt.
Mercer's interactions with Deckard and Isidore, at the end of the novel, have two 
important implications:  First, Mercer asserts his authenticity, by virtue of appearing to 
Deckard without use of the empathy box (195) and fulfilling the role of a saviour/deity, 
just as he has admitted to Isidore his own falsity; second, the content of Mercer's 
discourse shows us that Deckard's duty of retiring andys is less legal obligation than a 
formal, ontological one. 
To begin with, there is Deckard's use of the empathy box, before he leaves to 
confront the remaining three andys:
"How can I save you," the old man [Mercer] said, "if I can't save myself?" 
He smiled.  "Don't you see?  There is no salvation."
   "Then what's this for?" Rick demanded.  "What are you for?"
   "To show you," Wilbur Mercer said, "that you aren't alone.  I am here 
with you and always will be.  Go and do your task, even though you know 
it's wrong."
   "Why?" Rick said.  "Why should I do it?  I'll quit my job and emigrate."
   The old man said, "You will be required to do wrong no matter where 
you go.  It is the basic condition of life, to be required to violate your own 
identity.  At some time, every creature which lives must do so.  It is the 
ultimate shadow, the defeat of creation; this is the curse at work, the curse 
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that feeds on all life.  Everywhere in the universe."  (156)
When Mercer tells Rick that he must do his task, even though he knows it to be wrong, it 
calls to mind the comment made by Baynes in High Castle, that "we are all doomed to 
commit acts of cruelty or violence or evil" (High Castle 201), an uncompromising take 
on the moral system in which humans function.
The above interaction is soon followed by the disclosure that Mercerism is a 
"swindle," and that Wilbur Mercer is actually a drunken actor named Al Jarry (184). 
After this revelation, Isidore uses his empathy box, and finds himself in the tomb world. 
After he is "saved" by Mercer, the prophet admits his fraudulent nature:
"I am a fraud," Mercer said.  "They're sincere; their research is genuine. 
From their standpoint I am an elderly retired bit player named Al Jarry. 
All of it, their disclosure, is true.  They interviewed me at my home, as 
they claim; I told them whatever they wanted to know, which was 
everything."
   "Including about the whiskey?"
   Mercer smiled.  "It was true.  They did a good job and from their 
standpoint Buster Friendly's disclosure was convincing.  They will have 
trouble understanding why nothing has changed.  Because you're still here 
and I'm still here."  (189)
The next in this chain of events is Mercer's appearance before Deckard, even though the 
latter has not merged with Mercer through use of the empathy box.  Mercer actually 
appears embodied in the real world, and reiterates his message to Deckard: "What you are 
doing has to be done" (195).  Following this message, he warns Deckard about the 
specific dangers he is about to face, and because of his advice Deckard is able to survive 
his assault on the andys, and retires them in a fairly anti-climatic fashion.
Through his embodiment in the real world, and his prophetic advice to Deckard, 
Mercer is revealed to be "real," an authentic religious figure; a deity, of some sort.  And 
yet he admits to being a fabrication, a phony.  This is in keeping with the world Dick has 
created, where the distinction between authentic and "inauthentic" humans is irrevocably 
destroyed by the end of the novel.  It is also perfectly fitting that the deity of Dick's 
world--a truly postmodern world where the synthetic and the artificial have eclipsed the 
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authentic, where salvation is found not at the Church but through the television-like 
empathy box--is a fake, an image.  It is like one further degeneration, of the authentic into 
the inauthentic, that even the religious figurehead of Androids is revealed as a simulation. 
What is more, Mercer's message to Isidore intimates that this disclosure--that Mercerism 
is a "swindle"--will not affect the world in any way.  Like Iran, the people of the world 
are addicted to the fakery, are accepting of it.  This is reinforced by the conclusion of the 
novel, when Iran accepts the artificial toad as though it were real.  John Huntington 
writes about this moment: "The toad may turn out to be electric, and the novel may end 
on a note of satiric comedy as Iran, herself reinvigorated, orders artificial flies for the 
toad; but the re-engagement with a relative reality, however bogus, while a confession of 
the failure to achieve absolute reality, is also a lively escape from the black hole of 
absolute despair" (Huntington 176).  If Mercer is a deity, a religious figurehead for his 
world, then it stands to reason that he is at once both real and fake, authentic and 
inauthentic--thoroughly postmodern.  As Deckard puts it, "Mercer isn't a fake … Unless 
reality is a fake" (207).  The Christian God, in a sense, is outdated, and ill-suited for a 
world where real cannot be distinguished from fake, where "morality" is now a term 
based on arbitrariness rather than ethics.   
The second implication of Mercer's late-novel revelations, mentioned earlier, is 
that Deckard's job as a bounty hunter is more formal than ethical.  There is no ethical 
basis for Deckard's "retiring" the andys.  Since the deconstruction at work in the novel 
has shown that humans (Iran, Phil Resch) can act like androids and androids (Roy Baty, 
Rachael) show empathy similar to humans, and since the one defining factor, empathy, 
has been drawn into doubt, Deckard is left with no real moral position with which to 
justify his job.  Mercer, however, informs him that he must do wrong in any event.  In 
essence, Deckard is not upholding the law, but the ontology of the world he lives in. 
Even if the distinction between humans and androids is arbitrary, it must be sustained; the 
existence of the androids threatens a narrow definition of humanity.  If androids live, and 
are indistinguishable from man, then it is man who suffers the most from this 
comparison.  It is not unlike Wyndham-Matson's discourse on historicity in High Castle, 
where his comparison of a "real" historical lighter and its replica leads him to insist that 
"the word 'fake' meant nothing really, since the word 'authentic' meant nothing really" 
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(High Castle 63-64).  That "fake" humans (andys) can exist, indistinguishable from 
humans, calls into doubt the "authenticity" of humanity itself.  Deckard's job is to 
safeguard humanity by extinguishing doubt.  The andys are threatening not because they 
are murderous machines: "The machine, by declaring its right to live as an autonomous 
self, challenges the very categories of life and selfhood--and, in turn, the ontological 
prerogative of its creators" (Galvan 413). Phil Resch seems to understand this, claiming 
that bounty hunters "stand between the Nexus-6 and mankind, a barrier which keeps the 
two distinct" (Androids 124).  While Deckard is able to hold up his end of the deal, it is 
not without significant effect to him personally.
When fighting against the illusion and facing the reality of his morally ambiguous 
task, Deckard suffers from mental malaise and nearly  incapacitating existential doubt 
and fear: "For Mercer, everything is easy, he thought, because Mercer accepts everything. 
Nothing is alien to him.  But what I've done, he thought; that's become alien to me.  In 
fact everything about me has become unnatural; I've become an unnatural self"  And 
further: "I've been defeated in some obscure way.  By having killed the androids?  By 
Rachel's murder of my goat?" (Androids 204).   It is following this soul-searching that 
Deckard becomes fused with Mercer, despite the fact that he has not used an empathy 
box.  This fusion can be seen, metaphorically, as a fusion between Deckard and fakery, an 
immersion in simulation and the inauthentic.  It is this merger, paradoxically, that saves 
Deckard.  Like Juliana in High Castle, who discovers that her world is fictional, and finds 
this revelation freeing, Deckard is only able to continue after becoming one with the 
televisual deity.  He is eventually is pulled out of it by his discovery of the electric toad--
which may be seen as a rather sharp attack on the consumerism of the novel, since 
existential angst and spiritual revelation are short-circuited by the thought of material 
gain.   
If the definition between man and machine has become so flimsy, then a 
breakdown in reality, a dismissal of the "real," and an acceptance of the inauthentic are all 
necessary.  Carlo Pagetti says of Deckard, at the end of the novel: "He survives, after all, 
not to fulfill an impossible redemption, but to accept the true essence of life.  Life is a 
sequence of illusions, just as the holy toad on the hill is not a divine gift, but an artificial 
toy.  To realize that … is perhaps the beginning of a new consciousness, the search for the 
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truest self: the death of Wilbur Mercer is emphatically not the death of man" (Pagetti 24). 
The characters of High Castle may be satisfied to learn that theirs is not an authentic 
reality, but it remains to be seen how this knowledge will actually improve their lives; in 
Androids, by accepting, and to some degree by embracing the inauthenticity of their lived 
experience, Deckard and Iran arrive at a more mature understanding of the problems of 
postmodernity, of living in a world of simulacra and simulation; and this is seen, in the 
final pages, in Deckard's acceptance that "electric things have their lives, too.  Paltry as 
those lives are" (214), and by Iran's acceptance of the electric toad (216), which is all the 
more inauthentic for being a simulacrum of an animal that no longer exists.
The characters of Androids are surrounded by the simulated and the unreal.  There 
is the Penfield mood organ, the empathy box, and the andys themselves, all of which 
saturate the (presumed) empirical and authentic world with one of inauthenticity and 
replication.  Some critics have seen these forces within the novel as symptoms or tools of 
a repressive industrial-commercial system; critics such as Galvan, who sees that 
"Mercerism and the ideology of empathy that is its mainstay, far from appealing to innate 
human characteristics, function merely as the means by which the government controls 
an otherwise unwieldy populace" (Galvan 416), and Pagetti seems to concur, to some 
degree, when noting that "in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) society must 
defend itself against the overwhelming power of an industry of mechanical devices that 
introduces to the marketplace automata so perfect as to be confused with men and take 
their place" (Pagetti 22).  Galvan's claim, in particular, seems to be motivated by the brief 
mention in the novel that Mercerism is sanctioned by the UN: "…even the U. N. 
approved.  And the American and Soviet police had publicly stated that Mercerism 
reduced crime by making citizens more concerned about the plight of their neighbours. 
Mankind needs more empathy, Titus Corning, the U. N. Secretary General, had declared 
several times" (Androids 66).  Mercerism, the Penfield mood organ, the androids 
themselves--in this interpretation, all of them are tools whereby the powerful keep the 
weak docile, separate, and in line.  
Such a "conspiracy theory" is certainly in keeping with Dick's point of view, but it 
is more instructive to see the exploitation and alienation of mankind not as the primary 
goal of these forces, but as secondary (and perhaps even unintended) consequences. 
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These artificial tools are designed to make life easier--to make humans more empathetic, 
more happy and at ease, and, in the instance of the andys, to allow them to pass their 
work on to others.  However, one of the important results from these technological 
advances is the further alienation of man from his nature.  Replication supplants making; 
the symbol surpasses the original.  The world is replaced by its simulacrum, in the 
Baudriallardian sense, and mankind is soon to follow.  It is in this way that Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? speaks about life under late capitalism, about the postmodern 
condition.  This is the effect of cognitive estrangement; initially seeing the world of 
Androids as a totally fantastic fabrication, the reader soon recognizes their own.  Deckard 
comes to realize the inauthenticity of his own world, but unlike Juliana's realization in 
High Castle, the novel does not end there, and instead shows the reader how Deckard will 
attempt to continue on.  The realization, in this instance, is not enough; simply 
recognizing the fake for what it is no longer interests Dick--he needs to work with it, to 
examine the fake and to learn to live with it: "In effect, the narrative repudiates the idea 
of a confined human community and envisions a community of the post human, in which 
human and machine commiserate and co materialize, vitally shaping one another's 
existence" (Galvan 414).  Dick's truly postmodern heroes, like Deckard, cannot simply 
recognize the falsity of their own existence; instead, having come to this realization, they 
must learn to live with it.
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Conclusion
Sometime during December, 2005, Philip K. Dick went missing.  This Philip K. 
Dick was not the author, long dead, but an android, a simulacrum made in his image. 
Apparently, the head of the android took off from Las Vegas, and never arrived at its 
destination.  It is a strange coda to the life of a strange author, in whose work the line 
between man and machine was often crossed, and events, such as the one just described, 
took on philosophical, ontological meaning.
Why is Philip K. Dick important today?  Why have his ideas, his stories, gained 
traction more than 20 years after his death?  What is it about Dick's work that makes it 
poignant?
A journalist for the Village Voice, Erik Davis, famously described Dick as "an 
oracular postmodern."  Such a description is fitting, if first suitably qualified.  While Dick 
may have foreseen the way the world would look, so many years in his future, he was in 
no way a futurist; like most SF writers, he did not foresee cell phones, the GPS, or the 
Internet.  And so, as stories of a potential future, Dick's work generally falls short on the 
specific details.
And yet Dick's work seems more timely than ever.  This is because, while he 
missed the details, he was frighteningly accurate when discerning the big picture.  Dick's 
worlds are ones where the forces of consumerism have colonized every aspect of culture: 
where doors ask for money before opening for you; where advertisements take the form 
of flies and infest your car or your house; where God advertises on television.  His is a 
world where, as in High Castle, history loses all narrative force, and is reduced, instead, 
to a series of symbols, of signifiers, which have no direct relationship to the past; or, as in 
Androids, Dick portrays a world where animals, and even humanity, can be replicated as 
consumer items.  
Dick could not have imagined the microchip, or the digital era.  In fact, he was 
often humorously off the mark--in Ubik's futuristic world, one does not listen to, what 
would have been contemporary to Dick, a record player, but instead, a highly advanced, 
really nice record player.  What Dick did see was a world where the advances of 
technology were motivated primarily by capitalism, and where mankind, surrounded by 
duplicates, by copies, would become alienated.  His books are filled with average people, 
61
and their dilemma is that they live in a world where the individual has been devalued, and 
where a man struggles to exert individuality in the face of an overwhelming and nearly 
omnipotent system, one that is often technologically advanced and/or driven by the forces 
of consumerism.  The problem of authenticity, which plagues his work, is one that we 
encounter today.  As N. K. Hayles puts it:
Dick's narratives extend the scope of inquiry by staging connections 
between cybernetics and a wide range of concerns, including a devastating 
critique of capitalism, an idiosyncratic connection between entropy and 
schizophrenic delusion, and a persistent suspicion that the objects which 
surround us and indeed reality itself are fakes.  (422)
His fictions may not look like our world, but they feel like it--this is to say that the 
cognitive estrangement of SF, posited by Suvin, is especially felt to be true when a reader 
of the postmodern age encounters Dick's fiction.  
That Dick was a pulp fiction writer, and that popular feature films have been 
adapted from his work, only strengthens the connection between Dick and the 
postmodern world.  Even when the films stray far from the original--and this is almost 
always the case--they often retain a portion of Dick's engagement with postmodernity.  In 
Minority Report (Spielberg 2002), technological advances have made it possible for 
police to foresee crime, and so stop it before it happens.  When the head police officer is 
accused of "future crime," he has to prove that the technology can be fooled.  In effect, 
technology is shown to have reduced the freedom of the individual, and the narrative 
strives to fight against this.  (Spielberg, being less pessimistic than Dick, or perhaps more 
open to popular sentiment, allows his hero to succeed against the system, whereas Dick, 
in more truly postmodern fashion, sees the system as impenetrable.)  While Total Recall  
(Verhoeven 1990) is almost completely unrelated to its source material, it does nod 
toward the ever-present distrust, in Dick's work, of reality-as-a-given, by insinuating, to 
the astute viewer, that the entire narrative of the film may have been no more than a 
technologically-induced hallucination--that the whole experience has been, in a word, 
inauthentic.  
Furthermore, several popular films of the last several years can be described as 
"philDickian," since they share similar ideas with Dick's novels and short stories and 
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seem to share his concern with consumerism, replication, and, most importantly, the 
problem of authenticity.  Chief among these is The Truman Show (Weir 1998) which, like 
Dick's Time Out of Joint, revolves around a character who discovers that the world he 
thought was real has actually been constructed for him by outsiders; the novum of 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Gondry 2004)--a process whereby memories can 
be manipulated or removed--is almost identical to the one in Dick's short story We Can 
Remember It For You Wholesale; and Dark City (Proyas 1998) features yet another fake 
world which, unbeknownst to its inhabitants--and reminiscent of Do Androids Dream of  
Electric Sheep?--has been constructed for the purpose of finding out what makes one 
authentically human.  In the last ten years or so, it seems Dick's ideas have gained a 
certain amount of traction.
Dick's work is gaining ground now, because the concerns of our world are starting 
to mirror the concerns of Dick's fictional realities.  Androids may have posed questions 
about humanity that only mattered in a SF world--the question of humanity being created, 
as it were, by a sort of tautological argument, whereby "humanity" is questioned only 
when androids exist--but now, with advances in genetics and cloning, these questions 
seem more pertinent.  We will never live in a Dickian world, where virtual reality can be 
confused for reality, but we do live in one where the spectacle of war has replaced its 
reality, and where the horror of a terrorist attack is mostly lived virtually, through the 
television screen.  We live in a world where pictures can be digitally altered so 
convincingly that news organizations post them on their websites as originals, and where 
organic food has become so rare that it has to be advertised as such, to differentiate it 
from the morass of synthetic food products, or foods that are grown by artificial 
processes, that flood the marketplace.  In fact, "organic food" acts as a sort of 
simulacrum, pointing to the fact that the organic has almost disappeared, even from the 
realm of food.  And while Earth has not yet entered into World War Terminus, the world 
is suffering the ill effects, not of nuclear, but environmental meltdown.   
While Dick's work was not didactic, and offers no real world answers to the 
problems of authenticity, his work remains as an early engagement with these problems. 
Furthermore, Dick's work is important to the genre of SF, particularly American SF.  By 
dealing with cultural and ontological issues, Dick's work helped to move American SF 
63
away from the "Space Opera," and paved the way for academic criticism of SF as more 
than a pop culture or children's literature phenomenon.  Dick's opus can be seen as 
providing the foundations for a more mature SF, and for making inroads into the 
academic community that resulted in the fruitful relationship the genre and the critics 
now share.  
Dick's influence can be felt outside of the genre of SF as well.  Many authors who 
are considered paradigmatic of postmodernism, such as Thomas Pynchon and Don 
DeLillo, seem in some way influenced Dick--and, if these similarities are merely 
coincidental, then it goes to show that Dick had tapped into something poignant about 
postmodernism, and that all of these authors are similarly related to the deep structure of 
postmodernism.
Many of the academic concepts associated with postmodernism are evident in 
Dick's work, and, most importantly, can be more easily grasped by using Dick's work as a 
primary example of these concepts.  Guy Debord's concept of the society of the spectacle, 
Baudrillard's discussions of simulacra and simulation, Jameson's discussions of the 
capitalist basis of postmodernism--a prime and literary example of each can be found in 
Dick's work, meaning that it has a possible use as an explanatory tool for critical theory. 
Not only does his work relate to these concepts, but Baudrillard, Jameson, and Zizek 
have all named Dick in reference to their theories.  
Dick's legacy is deep, and this is due to how astute his observations were on the 
state of postmodernity and, as has been argued, his distrust of authenticity.  Dick's belief 
that the idea of "authenticity" was problematic, that the empirical world can not be taken 
as a given, and that reality is generally something constructed, brings to mind the work of 
Jacques Derrida.  Peter Fitting believes that, for these very reasons, Dick's work can be 
read as a discovery of ideology (in the critical, Marxist sense of the term):
Contemporary theorists contest this empirical positivism and argue that 
both the knowledge of reality and that of the subjects who 'know' are 
socially constructed.  Their theories raise the question of ideology and 
maintain that the practices and systems of representation that produce our 
understanding and perception of ourselves and of our reality play an 
essential part in the maintenance and reproduction of our existing 
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(capitalist) relations of production … I will argue that the scenes of 
discovery around which so many of his novels turn are, in a spontaneous 
and unconscious way, a representation of the discovery of ideology itself. 
(Fitting 93)
If mankind is posed with the problem of inauthenticity--if we are surrounded by fakes, by 
copies--then the question must be raised: what does count?  On what can we base our 
understanding of reality?  In The Man in the High Castle, Dick questions the notion of 
history, of its authenticity as a narrative by which human life can be understood.  He does 
this by inserting fake historical items into the narrative, and questioning how any item 
can be thought to have history within it.  He also does this through a self-reflexive 
postmodern trick, in which the history of High Castle's world is revealed to be fictive, 
and, by extension, positing that the reader's history may be no more authentic than the 
fictional one.  In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Dick questions the concept of 
authentic humanity.  Again, he does this by creating fake humans, andys, which call the 
concept of humanity into question; but, more to the point, he does this by undermining 
the so-called "humanity" of his characters by showing how artificial their lives are.  Thus 
the Penfield mood organ and the empathy religion of Mercerism.  These complications 
serve to question an authentic, original core to humanity, one that could not, under any 
circumstances, be reproduced technologically.  Dick seems to ask us if we are any more 
than the sum of our parts, and the postmodern malaise which he seems to suffer results in 
his own answer being a resounding "no."  
If history and mankind can be deconstructed, and thus shown to be constructs to 
begin with, and not absolutes, then the question remains: who is constructing them?  As 
Fitting posits above, Dick seems to be tapping into the concept of ideology, of dominant 
beliefs and culture being a creation of the dominant system--in this case, consumer 
capitalism.  In keeping with this interpretation, Dick's fiction abounds with characters 
discovering that the world they live in is a ruse, that there is always something or 
someone behind it, unseen.  And, for Dick, this system can never be overcome.
Still, it is instructive to see what Dick holds up as praiseworthy or, in effect, 
"authentic."  He privileges the craftsman, those people who work with their hands and 
create original pieces of work.  The EdFrank jewellery is one such example; the metal 
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squiggles that take shape on their own, but paradoxically are crafted with wu inside of 
them.  Dick, too, privileges religion, as long as it is not ideological; and so the I Ching, 
lacking a dominant ideology and viewed more as a tool by its users, is seen as a largely 
positive force, seemingly beyond questions of authenticity.  On the other hand, while the 
humanistic element of Mercerism is viewed in a positive light, the systemic, possibly 
ideological use as a tool for social control is viewed more sceptically, leaving Mercer as a 
paradoxical and ambiguous figure.  While the concept of empathy, in Androids, is 
increasingly problematized, it is considered, even in its absence, as the most humane and 
therefore authentic of human emotions.  
In the face of overwhelming postmodern despair, Dick does seem to feel that 
there is little hope for humanity.  The system will not be overthrown; however, if one 
clings to those truly authentic things--love, empathy, spirituality, handicrafts--one may 
still live a life that is relatively untouched by the forces of consumerism, which threaten 
to overcome Dick's worlds and our own.
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